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Abstract 
This study investigates the effects of military intervention in civil wars on post-war development. 
It was theorized that the characteristics of the intervention would influence the effects on 
development in different ways, and looks into its effects on three types of development: 
economic, social, and political. This paper looks at the effects of the regime-type of the 
intervener, the recipient of the intervention, the number of interveners, and whether the 
intervening state is neighboring the country in conflict or if it is from the same region. Results 
support the paper’s theory, finding that different characteristics of intervention had different 
effects on development. The study concluded that it is important to consider intervention 
characteristics when determining whether a country lending support to a side in a civil war will 
help or hinder the development of that state. 
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Introduction 
“To all of those outside Ghouta, living in peace and comfort … I wish to tell you that 
children, women, the elderly and infants are all dying today in full view of the world,” says a 
rescue worker, referring to an alleged chemical attack in Syria’s eastern Ghouta that killed over 
90 people (Shaheen 2018). This region was also home to the chemical attack that occurred in 
2013, which killed over 1,500 people by some estimates and nearly caused the United States to 
intervene in the Syrian civil war (Lander et al. 2013). The Syrian economy has also been affected 
by the civil war. The World Bank (2017) estimated that between 2011-2016, Syria experienced 
$226 billion of cumulative losses to its gross domestic product (GDP). This leads an important 
question for those with humanitarian and economic concerns: should countries intervene? 
Intervention that occurs during civil war is defined as an "internationalized internal 
armed conflict [that] occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal 
opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both 
sides" (Themner 2016). There are three types of intervention: (1) indirect, which is supporting 
either rebel or government forces through means other than military forces (ex: weapons, 
money, etc.), (2) direct unilateral, which is support through the sending of military forces by a 
state, and (3) direct multilateral, which is the same as direct unilateral except the support comes 
from a coalition of states (Naidu 2002).  
Arbour (2008) describes the principle of ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), which 
endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005, as a “permanent duty to protect 
individuals against abusive behavior.” However, Bellamy (2008) notes the confusion 
surrounding R2P due to its non-consensual nature, as some see it as a way to make giving 
humanitarian aid easier while others view it as a way to legitimize unilateral intervention. The 
Rudman 5 
 
R2P, and the disagreement surrounding its implications, suggest that intervention should be 
studied further in order understand its impact. 
Ahmad (2012) used Somalia's civil war as a case study to investigate the effects of 
intervention on the target state's economy. During its civil war, Somalia experienced a famine 
that led to international intervention, causing billions of dollars to be invested in international 
aid, in addition to peacekeeping forces being sent to the country. The monetary aid led to a vast 
expansion of the informal economy and created a militarized criminal enterprise. This allowed 
for warlords to consolidate power over their subjects with less reliance on them, thereby 
allowing the warlords to act in a more predatory manner towards the population in addition to 
creating incentive to keep the country in a state of dysfunction and collapse. In contrast, the north 
of the country, an unrecognized sovereign entity called Somaliland, did not experience such 
intervention. Instead of the disorder that the rest of the country faces, Somaliland has a peaceful 
and democratic system. This begs the following question: how much did Somalia benefit from 
international intervention and aid? 
The case of Somalia is not representative of all interventions, nor do all states that 
experience third-party involvement in civil conflict have the same characteristics of Somalia. In 
order to understand the impact of intervention, it is important to employ an empirical analysis 
that accounts for varying characteristics of both the conflict and the state the conflict takes place 
in. This is what the current study aims to do throughout the remainder of this paper.  
This study investigated the following research question: how does military intervention in 
civil wars impact post-war development in relation to economic, social, and political factors? 
The paper also posited a theory that suggested that the effects of intervention were mediated by 
the characteristics of the intervention (regime-type of the intervener, recipient of intervention, 
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etc.). The outcome variables were measured in the change in value from the initial end of the 
conflict to the value five, ten, and twenty years after the end of the conflict. Data from the 
UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset, the Polity IV dataset, and the World Bank were used. There 
were 52 conflicts that experienced intervention, which were compared to 347 conflicts without 
intervention by using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model. Results found that the 
effects of intervention varied based on the different characteristics of the intervener.  
This study found that intervention decreased growth rate while having no other 
significant effects on any of the other dependent variables. Interaction terms were also used to 
investigate the effects of intervention on post-war development. An interaction between length 
and intervention led to an additional increase in GDP per capita and autocracy levels, while 
decreasing growth rate. Meanwhile, an interaction between cumulative intensity and intervention 
increased growth rate, but decreased life expectancy and autocracy levels.  
Variables that were meant to capture the characteristics of interventions were also 
implemented. Interventions by a state with a democratic regime led to an additional increase in 
growth rate, but decreased gross national income (GNI) per capita and autocracy levels. 
Autocratic states intervening led to an increase in GNI per capita and life expectancy, but a 
decrease in growth rate and autocracy levels. It also led to a decrease in democracy levels after 
five and ten years; however, its effects after twenty years led to an additional increase in 
democracy levels that amounted to an overall net gain in democracy levels. Intervention in favor 
of the government and in favor of the rebels both increased GNI per capita; however, the former 
group also decreased growth rate. The number of intervening states in a conflict increased 
growth rate, mortality rate, and growth rate, while it decreased GDP per capita and autocracy 
levels. A state that neighbors the country in conflict intervening increased GDP per capita and 
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democracy levels, while it decreased life expectancy. Finally, a state that was located within the 
same region increased GDP per capita, while decreasing GNI per capita and mortality rate.  
Overall, this paper concluded that different intervention characteristics can have different 
effects on different types of development, and can sometimes aid one type of development while 
ailing the other. The findings in this study provided a number of contributions to the literature. 
First, it contributed to the idea that democracy levels and autocracy levels are not a part of the 
same scale, but can in fact coexist within a state. A number of results found that democracy 
levels and autocracy levels did not act as an inverse of one another, suggesting that they do not 
always act as an opposite. Another contribution this study makes is that the regime-type of the 
intervener is examined in the context of social and economic factors, whereas previous literature 
has focused mostly on democratization. Additionally, this study examined the effects that the 
number of states that intervene had on post-war development, and found that it was often 
beneficial. Krain (2005) used the number of interveners to measure the effects on human rights 
violations; however, it had not previously been used to look at development. Finally, this paper 
examined the effects of a neighboring state or a state from the same region intervening in a civil 
conflict. These variables have not been used previously in the context of intervention, and the 
results suggest that these types of interventions may have important implications in terms of 
development. 
This paper also has important policy implications. This paper’s findings indicate that 
interventions with different types of characteristics have varying effects on development. For 
example, if the United States, a democratic regime, want to promote democracy, its intervention 
would not have any effect on the democracy level of the state in conflict. However, if the goal is 
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to increase economic development, it should intervene since democratic intervention has a 
positive additional impact on growth rate. 
The following sections are organized in the following manner. Section one includes a 
review of past literature on the topic. Section two describes the methodology of the study, 
followed by the analysis plan and hypotheses. Section three provides the results. Section four 
discussed the findings while section five has the conclusion. 
Literature Review 
Before examining literature on intervention and civil wars, it is important to investigate 
how economic growth and development functions without such exogenous shocks. 
Economic Growth Theory  
There have been three waves of theory that attempt to explain economic growth. The first 
two, the Harrod-Domar model and the neoclassical model, both saw the lack of growth as a 
product of a lack of capital, which could be fixed through foreign aid or investment to bolster 
capital and, subsequently, growth (Eggertsson 2005). Economists, and financial institutions, 
saw the theory from the Harrod-Domar model to suggest that a country's capital-output ratio 
could be used to determine how much investment was needed in order to spur a certain level of 
growth (Kenny and Williams 2001). Unfortunately, when this idea was put into practice, little 
evidence suggested that investment increased growth (Snowdon and Vane 2002). A major issue 
with this theory was the assumptions made about technology. The neoclassical model put an 
emphasis on how improved technology should increase growth; however, it made the 
assumption that all countries have access to modern technology (Eggertsson 2005).  
The third wave, endogenous growth theory, provided a more practical model. This model 
put an emphasis on the private sector of economies, expanding on how a lack of investment in 
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private sectors, like education, also hinders growth (Eggertsson 2005). Because it focused on 
the private sector, endogenous growth theory also broke from the two former theories by 
focusing on markets with monopolistic competition (Romer 1990). This allowed the theory to 
assume that technology is not free, and producing new technology is costly for firms, requiring 
firms to have some sort of monopoly power as incentive (Romer 1994). Thus, this theory 
suggested that poverty is associated with small, isolated economies (Eggertsson 2005).  
The three theories all suggested that a major factor of growth is investment; however, the 
Harrod-Domar model and the neoclassical models were both hindered since they do not address 
how technology is not free of charge. The endogenous growth theory was therefore the most 
applicable theory as it included the private sector in its model, which allowed for a more 
elaborate assessment that suggested that investment should go to private sectors in order to spur 
economic growth. Regardless of this difference, all three models suggested that growth relies on 
four 'stylized facts': an increase in per capita income growth, a constant capital-output ratio, a 
trendless rate of rate of return to capital, and substantially different per capita growth rates 
across countries (Snowdon and Vane 2002).  
This section has laid out the theoretical framework of how economic growth and 
development function. However, the exogenous shock of a civil war can affect such 
mechanisms, which will be described later in this literature review. First, it is important to 
discuss the causes of civil wars. 
What Causes Civil Wars? 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argued that economic factors are most important when it 
comes to the causes of civil war. They found that population size and amount of natural 
resources increased the risk of civil war while income per capita decreases the risk of civil war. 
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Additionally, they found that there is a quadratic relationship between ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, where civil wars were most likely to occur when there were two groups of 
equal sizes and were less likely to occur as fractionalization increases. Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), like Collier and Hoeffler (1998), found that income per capita decreased the likelihood 
of civil war; however, oil reserves, population size, mountainous terrain, newly-formed states 
and political instability led to greater risk of conflict. Masfield and Snyder (2002) investigated 
the effects of institutional strength on the outbreaks of civil wars. They found that governments 
that did not fully transition into democracies, but rather only began the transition away from 
autocracy, or did not have strong central authorities were more prone to civil conflict.  
Reynal-Querol (2002) found similar results to Mansfield and Snyder (2002) and further 
reported a negative relationship between political inclusivity and likelihood of civil war. Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) also found that ethnic and religious measures were insignificant. Reynal-
Querol (2002) found that religious polarization increased the likelihood of ethnic civil wars. 
However, the author did find that religious fragmentation decreased the probability of ethnic 
civil conflict. Therefore, it appears that Collier and Hoeffler (1998), and Reynal-Querol (2002) 
stand in agreement while Fearon and Laitin (2003) contradicts their results. It is important to 
note that Reynal-Querol (2002) reports results from ethnic civil wars while Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) includes all types of civil wars. This could be the cause for the lack of consensus 
between the two authors. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) found a significant quadratic relationship. 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) did not test for this type of effect, which could be the reason they did 
not find significant results. In addition to the literature above, Dixon (2009) conducted a meta-
analysis of previous studies on the causes of civil wars and finds that there is no strong 
consensus from the data, either qualitative or quantitative, on what initiates these types of 
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conflicts. Therefore, while there appears to be uniform agreement among the authors reviewed 
above that political instability increases the likelihood of civil war, there is no clear relationship 
between ethnic and religious factors having an effect on the outbreak of civil war.  
Now that the determinant of intrastate conflicts has been described, it is important to 
understand the consequences, or costs, during the conflict. 
Costs of War 
Skaperdas (2011) examined previous studies on the costs of war. The author 
investigated multiple aspects regarding these costs. For example, the increase in military 
expenditure that occurs during war led to less funding for public goods. This ultimately led to 
the state being unable to fund social services and health care, which led to indirect effects on 
public health and wellbeing. Unsurprisingly, war also leads to a decrease in growth during the 
conflict. Additionally, civil war often causes the destruction of public infrastructure, as well as 
private capital. The author notes how Mozambique’s civil war saw a decrease in 20 percent of 
its stock of capital between the years 1980 and 1993, 60 percent of primary schools were no 
longer open, and 40 percent of immobile capital was non-operational. This loss of capital, 
according the section above on growth theory, has implications in terms of the state’s ability to 
maintain economic growth, which Skeperdas (2011) confirmed by suggesting that war leads to 
a decrease in the state’s growth rate. In terms of the effects on the population, the most obvious 
cost is the deaths caused by war. However, the impact that landmines have even after the war 
ends is more unknown. Before 2001, it was estimated that the average number of casualties by 
landmines was 26,000 per year. Another effect of landmines is that they render otherwise-
usable land uninhabited and unfarmed due to suspicion that landmines could be in the area. 
Furthermore, there was an estimated 32.9 million refugees and internally displaced persons in 
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2006, an increase of about 8 million from the previous decade. While the list above is certainly 
not exhaustive, Skaperdas (2011) provides a clear picture that the cost of war is high. 
While the states in which the civil war occurs is certainly impacted during the conflict, 
the question that is more relevant to this paper is the effects of conflict after it is over. 
Post-War and Development 
Studies observing the effects of conflict on social and economic factors post-war were 
conflicting. Kang and Meernik (2005) found that the keys to economic recovery revolve around 
government performance and international aid in order to revitalize the economy through 
capital investment since the state will have likely used up many of its resources during the 
conflict. This is consistent with growth theory since these results suggest that investment is 
needed in order for an economy to recover.  
The results from the study by Koubi (2005) suggest that there was a negative correlation 
between countries that have fought in a war and their growth rates when compared to countries 
that have not. The author also found that the severity of the war as well as its duration had a 
positive effect on economic growth. Collier (1999) also found that wars that have a longer 
duration experience a more rapid economic recovery.  
Gates et al. (2012) examined the effects of conflict on economic and social issues. They 
found that war had negative effects on undernourishment, poverty, life expectancy, and 
mortality rates. In terms of economic effects, the authors note that countries that took part in 
war experience a ‘catch-up effect’, where they show faster growth rates than normal. Though, 
like Kang and Meernik (2005), they note it was likely due to international aid. 
Chen et al. (2008) also looked at the effects of conflict on economic and social factors, as 
well as political ones. The authors found that after the end of the conflict the economy 
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recovered swiftly, with output per capita and capital investment increasing while inflation 
decreased. Per capita growth in GDP was higher in countries that experienced conflict when 
compared to both their respective pre-war levels and growth rates from comparable countries. 
Investment rates were also higher in conflict countries, which likely was part of the reason that 
the growth rates were higher. In terms of social aspects, the authors found that primary-school 
enrollment had a positive relationship, but the opposite was true for secondary-school 
enrollment. Politically, democratic rights recover slowly; however, law and order improved 
rapidly. Overall, Chen et al. (2008) found that economic, social, and political development 
experienced gradual improvement after the end of the war.  
The section above describes the effects of civil war. However, the literature above does 
not take into account the effects of an intervening party. This leads to the central question of the 
current paper: what are the effects of intervention in civil wars on development?  
Third-Party Intervention in Civil Wars 
Economic and Social Impacts 
Past literature has also indicated that there are certain developmental consequences of 
third-party intervention in conflicts; however, there is not a consensus on whether these effects 
are positive or negative. This study provides a theory for why this was the case, which posits 
that different aspects of intervention mediates different effects on development. In other words, 
heterogeneous effects on the characteristics of intervention will influence development 
differently. The literature below provides support for the study’s theory. 
Regan (2002) investigated the effects of intervention, both economic and military, on the 
duration of conflicts. Results indicated that both types of intervention increase the lengths of 
conflict. Breaking intervention down by who received the aid, pro-government, pro-rebel, or 
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neutral, did not alter the findings that intervention lengthens conflict. However, an interaction 
term between intervention in favor of the rebel group and the timing in which the intervention 
occurred yielded negative effects, which suggests that interventions that occur late in the 
conflict in support of rebels leads to a quicker resolution of the conflict than if the intervention 
took place earlier. Regan’s analysis would have positive implications in terms of development 
if one compares the results with the studies by Collier (1999) and Koubi (2005), who found a 
positive relationship between war duration and economic growth. 
Pickering and Kisangani (2006) employed a time series cross sectional design to 
investigate the effects intervention had on developing states’ governing institutions, economic 
performance, as well as the quality of life of citizens. Their analysis involved dividing 
observations in multiple ways: by whether or not the state in which the conflict occurred was a 
democracy and whether the intervention was in support of the government or against the 
government. They found that when the state was not democratic and the intervention was 
hostile towards the government there was an increase in democratization of the country. There 
was also evidence that the intervention increased economic growth in the short run. Conversely, 
when intervention was in favor of the government that was non-democratic there was a 
decreased likelihood of democratization and a decrease in economic growth. Interventions that 
occurred in democratic states led to a decrease in quality of life when results were measured ten 
years after the end of the conflict; however, no other variables yielded significant results. The 
authors concluded that while hostile interventions are helpful in terms of development, 
intervention in democratic states are not really affected by third-parties. However, as the 
authors note, the study is limited by the fact that there was a small number of observations for 
when intervention occurred in democratic states, which may have led to a bias in the results. 
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Kim (2017) used an ordinary least squares (OLS) model to examine how interventions in 
civil wars affect the quality of life of citizens within the country in conflict after the war ended. 
The author used a composite measure of life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy rate in 
order to measure quality of life. Additionally, interventions by the United Nations and those 
done unilaterally by a country were analyzed separately. Results indicated that when the United 
Nations intervenes, quality of life increased, while unilateral interventions caused quality of life 
to decrease. Interaction terms were used to further analyze these relationships. When there was 
intervention in support of the government and the opposition forces were victorious, the country 
experienced an increase in quality of life; whereas quality of life decreased when the war ended 
with a negotiated settlement. When the opposition forces received third-party support and the 
war ended in either a negotiated settlement or a victory in their favor, there was a decrease in 
quality of life. Based on these results, one would conclude that intervention is beneficial only 
when it comes from the United Nations. One downside to the methodology chosen by the 
author is that the analysis does not fully account for long-term effects from intervention. 
Instead, it measures the annual percent change of its dependent variables, which may not fully 
capture the longevity of the impacts. Regardless, these results appear to be consistent with 
Pickering and Kisangani (2006) since both suggest that intervention in favor of the opposition 
increases quality of life.  
Democratization 
Before investigating the impact that intervention has on democratization, it is important 
to mention the relevance of democracy in relation to growth and development.  
Leblang (1997) investigated the relationship between democracy and economic growth 
using a pooled time series cross sectional dataset. The author found that, contrary to past 
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research, democracy accelerates economic growth. This was attributed to the fact that the study 
accounted for variation across country and that the time for the effects to be felt could vary. 
Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu (2008) used a meta-analysis to measure the impact that 
democracy has on growth. They found that democracy has positive, indirect effects on growth, 
with increased human capital and economic freedom while inflation and political instability was 
decreased. Therefore, these two studies suggest that there is a significant link between 
democracy and economic growth.  
Additionally, promoting democracy has been the motivation for intervention in the past 
and could be in the future as well (Gleditsch et al. 2007). Therefore, in terms of policy 
implications, it is important to evaluate the effects on democracy and autocracy levels in order 
to validate- or dissuade- this mode of increasing democracy through intervention in the future. 
Democracy and Intervention 
Gleditsch et al. (2007) investigated the relationship between the regime-type, either 
democratic or autocratic, of the intervener and the democratization of the target country. They 
found that democratic states as the interveners were significantly more likely to cause 
democratization immediately after the intervention occurs; however, this relationship was not 
significant five years later. The authors suggest that selection bias could be affecting the results, 
as they suggest that democratic interventions occur in countries that already had a high 
probability to democratize. Two subsequent analyses were done in order to attempt to combat 
this. First, the relationship between regime-type of intervener and the probability of a change in 
regime-type of the target state was tested where the three potential outcomes were 
democratization, autocratization, and no change. Results suggested that democracies lead to 
democratization and autocracies lead to autocratization. However, democracies did not decrease 
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the likelihood of autocratization, nor did autocracies decrease the likelihood of democratization. 
The second test looked at the movement of regime-type of the country in conflict in three 
categories: autocracy, semi-democracy, and democracy. Change in regime-type was then 
analyzed by looking at the percent-change of the initial regime and the type of regime in place 
after the intervention. They found that most countries that began as a semi-democracy stayed in 
that category while there were more changes into autocracy than there was democracy. 
Subsequently, the findings from this paper concluded that democratic interventions do not lead 
to democratization. 
De Mesquita and Downs (2006) also investigated the effects of intervention on 
democracy level, coalition size, and the competitiveness of the party system. Like Gleditsch et 
al. (2007), they divide their analysis by the type of intervener. However, in addition to having 
two categories of autocratic and democratic, they also include whether the intervener was the 
United States or the United Nations. They found that while the United States intervening had a 
positive effect on democracy, an autocratic regime or the United Nations had a negative effect. 
A democratic state intervening had no significant effect. These results support the findings of 
Gleditsch et al. (2007). The United Nations also had a negative relationship with coalition size 
and competitiveness of participation in the party system, with the same being true for 
democratic interveners. The United States had positive effects for both while autocratic states 
had no effect. De Mesquita and Downs (2006) also note that a selection effect exists for when 
the United States decides to intervene. In order to attempt to counteract this, they examined the 
percent-change of their dependent variables within a ten-year period, comparing only the cases 
when the intervener is either the United States or another democracy. They found that there was 
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no difference between the two types of interveners, leading to the same conclusions as the 
original analysis that intervention is not an effective means to promote democracy.  
While de Mesquita and Downs (2006) and Geditsch et al. (2004) found that intervention 
was harmful to democratization, Pickering and Kisangani (2006) found that intervention in 
opposition to the government when the state is not democratic leads to democratization. This 
contradiction is interesting because while de Mesquita and Downs (2006) and Geditsch et al. 
(2004) account for regime-type of intervener in their analyses, Pickering and Kisangani (2006) 
divide their interventions by who is getting the support. Both types of analyses are useful and 
are what the other respective paper lacks. The question arises of whether the former two authors 
would have found different results had they accounted for whether the intervention was in favor 
of the government or opposition party or would the latter have found similar results to the 
former. Pickering and Kisangani (2006) did not reveal findings that found all intervention 
improves democracy, but rather only when there is an intervention in a non-democracy that is 
hostile towards the government; it is still significant since that is likely the type of intervention 
that would occur if a country, like the United States, attempted to change the regime-types of 
developing countries through intervention. Therefore, this study will attempt to remedy this 
contradiction by including both who received intervention and the regime of the intervener. 
Duration of Peace  
Another important aspect of whether intervention is beneficial revolves around whether 
peace lasts. Fortna (2004) examined whether the presence of peacekeepers caused peace to last 
longer. The analysis was divided into multiple sections. First, there were two timeframes in 
which conflicts were observed. There were conflicts that covered the full post-World War II 
period and there was also a period of observations that only observed conflicts that occurred 
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after the end of the Cold War. Additionally, the peacekeeper was split into three categories: all 
peacekeeping forces, United Nations forces, and non-United Nations forces. Finally, the type of 
peacekeeping mission was split into four groups: observer, traditional, multidimensional, and 
enforcement missions. Results found that there was no significant difference in duration of 
peace when observing at the post-World War II timeframe. In the post-Cold War period, there 
was a positive relationship between all peacekeeping forces and United Nations peacekeeping 
forces. However, non-United Nations forces yielded no significant results, meaning that the 
significant results found when looking at all types of peacekeeping forces was likely due to the 
United Nations forces. In regard to the type of peacekeeping missions, observer missions were 
positively related to duration of peace in the post-World War II period, but only jointly 
significant in the post-Cold War period. Enforcement was only positively jointly significant in 
the post-Cold War period. Traditional was positively jointly significant and positively 
significant in the post-World War II and post-Cold War periods, respectively. Multidimensional 
was positively jointly significant in both periods. While these results appear to indicate that 
United Nations peacekeeping efforts are useful, the author notes that the small sample size 
could be cause for concern. 
Kenwick (working paper)1 also investigated the effects of intervention on the durability 
of peace. The author found that while there was no relationship between intervention and the 
duration of peace, peace that was accomplished through a negotiated settlement with third 
parties led to a more unstable peace. The lack of consensus between Fortna (2004) and 
Kenwick (working paper) is likely due to the fact that the former paper accounted for the 
                                                          
1 No date was found regarding this source on the paper itself or throughout any databases. A search on the author’s 
website and CV to find a date for the paper were also in vain. 
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different types of interveners whereas the latter did not. This further shows the importance of 
interaction terms in finding robust results when it comes to this topic. 
Human Rights Violations 
While the other papers have mainly focused on the effects of intervention after the end of 
the conflict, Krain (2005) and Peksen (2012) investigated the relationship between intervention 
and human rights violations during the conflict. Krain (2005) found that the presence of a third-
party had no effect on the severity of genocides or politicides, nor did impartial or balanced 
interventions. When the author investigated how the number of interveners influenced the 
severity, it was discovered that while interventions in favor of the perpetrator had no effect, 
interventions that directly challenged the perpetrator group led to a decrease in severity. 
Therefore, the findings of the study suggest that the only way to decrease the severity of state-
sponsored murder is to directly oppose the government.  
Peksen (2012) looked at the effects of intervention on extrajudicial killings, 
disappearances, torture, and political imprisonment, while also looking at the different types of 
intervention (supportive towards the government, hostile towards the government, and neutral). 
Results indicated that supportive interventions led to an increased likelihood of extrajudicial 
killings, disappearances, torture, and political imprisonment. Hostile intervention led to an 
increased probability of political imprisonment, and neutral intervention caused a higher 
likelihood of killings, disappearances, and torture. The author also measured the effects seven 
years after the conflict and found that the results were lasting for extrajudicial killings and 
torture when there was supportive intervention, political imprisonment when there was hostile 
intervention, and all relationships for neutral interventions were lasting. These findings suggest 
that intervention has negative effects on human rights, regardless of what side receives support. 
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This stands in slight contradiction to Krain (2005), as that study found that hostile interventions 
had a negative effect on severity. However, that result was only found when the number of 
interveners was evaluated. Instead of this being a conflicting outcome it is more likely that it is 
due to the use of interaction terms in order to find a fuller picture.  
The literature above describes the effects of intervention on the target country. However, 
there is another question that must be asked: do all civil wars have the same likelihood of 
having intervention occur? 
Selection Effect and When Interventions Occur 
Literature has noted that there is an inherent endogeneity concern regarding studying the 
effects of interventions in conflict. For example, De Mesquita and Downs (2006) and Gleditsch 
et al. (2007) both noted that a selection bias, or selection effect, was likely present in their 
papers. Fortna (2004) examined the question of when peacekeepers intervene, either by United 
Nations forces or unilateral forces. The author found that interventions by the United Nations 
were less likely when there was a clear victor. Consent-based intervention by either type of 
group was more likely when the conflict ended in a stalemate. There was no significant effect on 
likelihood of intervention when the conflict was an identity-conflict. Additionally, deaths from 
the war only had a significant effect on the probability of an intervention occurring when the 
missions were an enforcement-missions. However, countries with large armies did experience a 
smaller probability of intervention. Ultimately, the author concluded that while the question of 
where peacekeepers are sent is complicated, peacekeepers tend to go where they are most needed 
and not where peace is most likely.   
Gilligan and Stedman (2003) conducted a study to examine when peacekeeping missions 
occurred. The authors found that the largest predictor of intervention was deaths related to the 
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conflict, while power dynamics of a government in relation to other powers were also held in 
consideration. Regional considerations also had an effect on the decision to intervene. 
Ultimately, the results of this paper indicate that, when it comes to the United Nations, certain 
characteristics led to a higher chance of intervention. Koga (2011), when looking at the 
differences in intervention preferences between democracies and autocracies, found that 
democracies were more likely to intervene in favor of a rebel group when they share an ethnic tie 
while autocracies were more likely to intervene when a lootable resource was present.  
The articles mentioned above support the notion that a selection effect exists, meaning 
that not all conflicts are equally likely to receive intervention. This has important implications in 
terms of the limitations of studies that aim to capture the effects of interventions, as endogeneity 
issues are inherent. There are certain econometric strategies that can be taken in order to attempt 
to counteract this concern. The implementation of fixed effects for region and years can be used 
for this purpose. An alternative to this method is to use an instrumental variable. Instrumental 
variables are variables that are correlated with outcome terms only through their relationship 
with other variables (Angrist et al. 1996). However, this method was not used since an adequate 
instrument could not be determined. The issues that arise due to the selection effect will likely be 
present, regardless of the implementation of methods like the ones stated above; however, the 
limitations that it brings can at least be minimized. 
The literature above was conflicting in its results at time, partly due to the different 
heterogeneous terms that were used by different researchers. For example, de Mesquita and 
Downs (2006) and Geditsch et al. (2004) looked at the effects of the regime-type of the 
intervener and found the effects to have a negative impact on democratization. Meanwhile, 
Pickering and Kisangani (2006) investigated which side received the intervention and found that 
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support for the rebel side in a non-democratic state increased democratization. Therefore, while 
both look at the effects of intervention on democratization, the differing heterogeneous effects 
that were implemented led to differing results. This supports the theory that the effects of 
intervention will vary based on the characteristics of the intervention that are being taken into 
account. 
Hypotheses 
 A number of hypotheses were made regarding the results of the different dependent and 
intervention variables. Due to a lack of clear consensus in the literature, conflicting theories, and 
the small number of previous papers on the topic, it was not possible to justify a one-tailed test 
for any of the predictions. Subsequently, all predictions were tested using a two-tailed estimate; 
however, the hypotheses below reflect the expected sign of some of the variables that appeared 
to have a consensus among the literature. 
Intervention  
 Past literature was conflicting when it came to the effects of intervention in general, 
which made it inappropriate to estimate the direction of the relationships. Therefore, it was 
hypothesized that intervention would have an effect on economic, social, and political factors.  
Regime-Type of Intervener 
 There were two types of regimes of the intervener that were examined: autocracies and 
democracies. Literature found that while autocracies intervening has previously led to a decrease 
in democracy levels, democracies have had no effect (Gleditsch et al. 2007). Additionally, there 
were no past studies that have looked at the effect of regime-type of intervener on economic or 
social development. This study hypothesized that autocracies intervening would have a negative 
impact on democracy levels and democratic intervention would have an effect on democracy 
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levels. Both autocracies and democracies providing third-party support were expected to have a 
significant impact on social and economic development.   
Recipient of Third-Party Support 
 Past studies have found a positive relationship between intervention in support of rebel 
forces and development and a negative relationship when support was given to the government 
(Pickering and Kisangani 2006). These same relationships were expected in this study: support 
for rebels would have a positive effect on economic, social, and political factors, and support for 
the government would have a negative effect on these three categories.  
Number of Interveners 
 Krain (2005) found that the number of interveners had a negative relationship with 
severity of human rights violations. However, this article did not look at post-war effects, 
making this article ineffective at basing the direction of the effect on. Subsequently, it was 
hypothesized that the number of interveners would have an effect on post-war development.    
Interaction Terms 
 The two interaction terms, duration and intensity, were both previously found to have a 
positive effect on development while not taking intervention into account (Koubi 2005). 
Therefore, it was expected that there would be the same positive relationship between 
development and an interaction between (a) duration and (b) cumulative intensity.  
Overall Hypothesis 
 While some of the hypotheses above provided hopeful expectations for the outcome of 
intervention on development, the literature that was discussed previously in the paper provided a 
cynical outlook on the effects of third-party intervention in civil conflicts. Consequently, it was 
expected that, even though some effects might suggest that intervention was beneficial, third-
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party involvement in civil wars would have a negative impact on economic, social, and political 
factors after the conflict ended.  
Methodology 
The Data 
 Observations of intrastate conflicts between the years 1960 and 2016 were provided by 
version 17.1 of Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute Oslo (UDCP/PRIO) 
Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002), which has been used in a number of previous 
studies (Gates et al. 2012)2. This dataset also had conflicts that were not intrastate; however, all 
of them were dropped for the current analysis. All variables, unless specified otherwise, came 
from this dataset.  
Outcome Variables 
 This study will look at multiple types of dependent variables in order to analyze the 
effects of intervention on development. All variables were measured in multiple years: the year 
the conflict ended, five years, ten years and twenty years after the end of the conflict in order to 
test the longevity of effects. For the analysis, the change between the initial year observation and 
the value five, ten, and twenty years after the end of the conflict were examined since this would 
help scale the variables that would otherwise naturally vary by state.  
 The following economic variables were used as outcome variables: growth rate, gross 
national income (GNI) per capita, and real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The log of 
GDP and GNI was taken in order to measure these variables in percentages. Growth rate was 
also measured in percent. Additionally, life expectancy and mortality rate were used to capture 
the effects on social factors. Life expectancy was measured in years while mortality rate was 
                                                          
2 https://www.prio.org/Data/ provides a list of published studies that used data by UCDP/PRIO. 
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measured in number of deaths per 1000 members of the population. All variables above were 
taken from the World Bank database. Finally, democracy level and autocracy level were used to 
capture the implications of intervention on political institutions. The democracy and autocracy 
variables from the Polity IV dataset were used to measure the political effects of intervention 
(Marshall 2016). Both democracy and autocracy are measured since the Polity IV codebook 
infers its support of Eckstein and Gurr’s (1975) theory that democratic and autocratic regimes are 
distinct patterns of authority that can both be present within the same state. 
Independent Variables 
 The main independent variable was whether intervention occurred, which was equal to 
one if there was intervention and equal to zero otherwise. There were multiple other measures 
that related to intervention that were meant to provide a more robust understanding of the 
intervention’s effects on development. Inspired by Gleditsch et al. (2007) and De Mesquita and 
Downs (2006), the regime-type of the intervener was evaluated using the democracy and 
autocracy measures from the Polity IV dataset. Both democracy and autocracy were on scales of 
zero to ten, with ten being the highest level of democracy and autocracy, respectively. If the 
democracy level was greater than five, then the intervener was considered democratic. An 
autocracy score that was greater than five led to the intervention considered an autocratic 
intervention.  When there were multiple interveners, the average democracy and autocracy levels 
were used. If the number of interveners was 19 or more, the democracy level was coded to equal 
10 and autocracy levels were coded to equal 0 since the intervention was likely organized by an 
international body. While it is possible that this assumption is inaccurate, there were only two 
instances where there were at least 19 interveners, making the risk of biasing the results low. 
Additionally, previous literature suggested that the side that receives intervention has a 
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significant impact on the outcome (Kim 2017; Peksen 2012; Pickering and Kisangani 2006; 
Regan 2002). Two dummy variables were generated to evaluate this effect: whether the 
government (side A) received third-party support and whether the opposition (side B) received 
aid. Krain (2005) suggest that the number of interveners is an important factor. Therefore, a 
variable was generated to account for the number of interveners for each side of the conflict.  
Control Variables 
 The following variables were used as controls: region, length, whether the conflict 
occurred during the Cold War, the intensity of the conflict, the cumulative intensity of the history 
of conflict, whether the country was a democracy at the initial end of the conflict, incompatibility 
of the conflict, and if a subsequent civil conflict occurred within five years after the end of the 
current conflict. Region was broken into the following five dummy variables, which equaled one 
if the conflict occurred in the region and zero otherwise: Europe, Middle East, Asia, Africa, and 
Americas. The length of conflict was measured in days between the start and end dates of the 
conflict provided by the UCDP/PRIO data. A Cold War variable was generated to equal one if 
the conflict occurred during the years in which the Cold War took place (1947-1991) and zero 
otherwise. This variable was used because the competition for influence and control by the 
United States and the Soviet Union could have caused outcomes to vary from what they 
normally would have been. The intensity of the conflict was equal to zero if the war was 
considered to be minor (between 25 and 999 battle related deaths in a given year) and one if it 
was considered a war (greater than 1000 battle-deaths in a given year). The cumulative intensity, 
which measured the intensity of the history of the conflict, was coded as one if the number of 
battle-deaths since the onset of the initial conflict was greater than 1000 and was coded as zero 
otherwise. The democracy variable from the Polity IV dataset was used to measure if the country 
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was a democracy at the end of the conflict, which equaled one if the country was considered a 
democracy, and zero otherwise (Marshall 2016). A country was considered democratic if their 
democracy level was greater than five at the end of the conflict. Incompatibility was defined as 
“a general coding of the conflict issue.” (Themner 2016). There were three possible values: one 
if the conflict was fought over territory, two if it was because of government, and three if it was 
because of both. Since only one observation occurred that was because of both, this was turned 
into a dummy variable that equaled zero if it was fought over territory and one if it was fought 
over government (the one fought over both was observed in both instances). Finally, a dummy 
variable was generated to capture whether a conflict reoccurred within five years since the 
subsequent conflict would hinder the state’s ability to recover from the current conflict. 
Interaction Terms 
 A number of variables were generated in order to capture heterogeneous effects. Regan 
(2002), paired with findings by Collier (1999) and Koubi (2005), suggest that the intervention 
lengthens the conflict, which leads to a more rapid economic recovery. Therefore, an interaction 
term was created between length of the conflict and intervention in order to capture this effect. 
Additionally, Koubi (2005) found that the severity of a conflict increases post-war development. 
While the author’s findings did not assess the effects of intervention, an interaction term between 
intensity of the conflict and intervention was generated to analyze whether this relationship holds 
true when third-parties are involved. 
Analysis Plan 
Determinants of Intervention 
 Inspired by Fortna (2004), the first step this paper took in its analysis was to evaluate the 
selection effect that was likely present within the dataset. This was done with regressions using 
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intervention as the dependent variable in order to measure whether differences were significant. 
To further measure the effects of the intervener’s regime-type, the same was done using 
intervention when the third-party was a democracy and when it was an autocracy. This was done 
using the democratic and autocratic intervener variables. All relevant control variables were 
included in order to capture the differences in when intervention occurred. Robust standard 
errors were used throughout this analysis to control for heteroskedasticity. The equation for this 
analysis was the following: 
1. 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼5ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
Where 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 refers to intervention, regioni refers to the region variables (Middle East, Africa, Asia, 
Americas, and Europe), poli refers to the political factors of the conflict (whether the country was 
a democracy at the end of the conflict and whether it began during the Cold War), conflictchari 
refers to the characteristics of the conflict (the intensity and reason for the conflict), and histi 
refers to the variables that describe the past and future history of the conflict (whether a conflict 
occurred within five years of the current conflict and cumulative intensity). 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 refers to the time 
fixed effects. 
The Impact of Intervention 
 Multiple equations were used in the analysis of the effects of intervention. All used 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Additionally, all equations were run using robust standard errors 
in order to combat heteroskedasticity. 
 Equation 2 used intervention as the independent variable, the economic, political, and 
social factors as the dependent variables, and a number of control variables. The equation was 
the following: 
2. 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
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Where Yi refers to the dependent variable, int refers to the intervention term, regioni refers to the 
region variables (Middle East, Africa, Asia, Americas, and Europe), poli refers to the political 
factors of the conflict (whether the country was a democracy at the end of the conflict and 
whether it began during the Cold War), conflictchari refers to the characteristics of the conflict 
(intensity, incompatibility, and length), and histi refers to the variables that describe the past and 
future history of the conflict (whether a conflict occurred within five years of the current conflict 
and cumulative intensity). Tt is the time fixed effects. 
 The third equation included interaction terms for length X intervention and cumulative 
intensity X intervention:  
3. 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽5𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
Where Yi refers to the dependent variable, inti refers to the intervention term, length refers to the 
length of the conflict in days, cumintensi refers to the cumulative intensity of the conflict, 
intilengthi refers to the interaction between length and intervention, inticumintensi refers to the 
interaction between cumulative intensity and intervention. The remaining terms are the same as 
from the second equation.3 
The Types of Intervention and Interveners 
 An analysis into the types of intervention was conducted. OLS regressions with robust 
standard errors were conducted on the dependent variables using three different types of 
interaction terms with intervention variables: regime-type of the intervener, the type of 
intervention, and the number of interveners. Two separate regressions per dependent variable 
were used to analyze the regime-type of the intervener, using the democratic intervener and 
                                                          
3 Length and cumulative intensity were removed from their categorizations from Equation 2 in order to illustrate the 
interaction terms in the equation. 
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autocratic intervener variables. Two more regressions per outcome variable were run using the 
three types of intervention: intervention in favor of the government (side A) and intervention in 
favor the opposition (side B). An additional regression was run per dependent variable 
incorporating the number of intervener term. Finally, the effects of intervention on the dependent 
variables were measured when the intervention came from either a neighboring state or a state 
from the same region as the country in conflict. The equation for the regressions above are as 
follows: 
4. 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟1𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽5𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  
Where Yi refers to the dependent variable, inti refers to the intervention term, intchar1i refers to 
the first intervention-characterization variable (regime-type, type of intervention, number of 
interveners, or location of interveners) while intchar2i refers to the second intervention-
characterization term, and intiintchar1i and intiintchar2i refers to the interaction between the 
intervention term and the intervention-characterization term. The remaining variables were the 
same as from Equation 2.  
Results 
Descriptive Results 
 Tables 1-4 provide the following results. Tables 4-6 show basic summary statistics of the 
outcome variables. There were 399 cases of civil conflicts observed, with 52 conflicts 
(approximately 13%) experiencing intervention and 347 conflicts (approximately 87%) not 
experiencing intervention. The average length of conflict in days was 6243.6 days, while the 
average length of conflicts that experienced intervention was 5451.6 days and those that did not 
experience intervention was 6361.6 days. Conflicts whose intensity variable indicated that they 
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were considered wars accounted for 12.5% of observations. Approximately 26.9% of 
interventions took place in wars while 10.4% of conflicts that did not experience intervention 
were wars.  
States that were democracies at the end of the conflict accounted for 45.9% of the 
observations. Democratic states that housed conflicts experienced intervention 46.2% of the time 
while there was not intervention 45.8% of the time. The cumulative intensity was greater than 
1,000 battle-deaths 50.9% of the time, with intervention occurring 69.2% of the time that this 
was true while no intervention occurred 48.2% of the time. Approximately 47.6% of conflicts 
were fought over government, with this being true 59.6% of the instances intervention occurred 
while 45.8% of the conflicts without intervention were fought over government. Of the 401 
conflicts observed, 52.6% had a conflict occur within five years. Approximately 32.7% of 
conflicts that experienced intervention had another conflict occur within five years while 55.6% 
of conflicts without intervention experienced a reoccurrence of conflict within five years. The 
Cold War had 70.3% of conflicts occur during its time period, with 53.8% of them experiencing 
intervention and 72.8% without.  
Europe had 10.5% of conflicts occur within its region, with 21.2% of conflicts with 
intervention being in Europe and 8.9% without intervention. The Middle East housed 13.5% of 
conflicts, with the frequency of conflicts with intervention and without intervention in the region 
both also being 13.5%. Thirty-one percent of conflicts occurred in Asia, with conflicts with 
intervention being in the region 17.3% while conflicts without intervention occurred in Asia 
33.2% of the time. Africa housed the most conflicts with 36.9%. Forty-four percent of conflicts 
that experienced intervention occurred in Africa while the same was true for 35.8% of conflicts 
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without intervention. The Americas experienced 7.5% of the conflicts in the dataset, and 3.8% 
and 8% of conflicts with and without intervention, respectively. 
Figure 14: Map of Where Conflicts Occur 
 
The apparent difference between conflicts that experienced intervention and those that did not 
was further tested to see if such differences were significant. T-tests were run in order to test this. 
The results can be seen in tables 1-3. There was a significant difference between the intensity of 
the conflict when intervention occurred, with a conflict being classified as a war 
Figure 25: Map of Where Interventions Occur 
                                                          
4 Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of civil conflicts within the study’s time period. Lighter shaded countries, like 
the United States, have experienced fewer conflicts than the darker shaded countries, like India.  
5 Figure 2 shows the distribution of states that underwent conflict (red) compared to those who also experienced 
intervention (green).  
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0.1655 points (p = 0.0125) less when intervention occurred. There was a significant difference in 
conflicts fought over government of -.1379 points (p = 0.0657) between instances that 
experienced intervention and those that did not. The differences between conflicts experiencing 
intervention in conflicts in Asia compared to conflicts without intervention was 0.1593 points (p 
= 0.0082), while the difference in conflicts in Europe was -0.1227 points (p = 0.0426). The 
difference between conflicts in the Cold War that experienced intervention and those that did not 
was 0.1893 (p = 0.0126). The difference in wars that experienced intervention compared to those 
that did not was 0.2110 (p = 0.0657). Finally, wars that experienced intervention also 
experienced another war within five years of the end of the current conflict 0.2293 points more 
than conflicts that did not experience intervention. The outcomes from the t-tests of the 
remaining variables did not yield significant results. 
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 These results indicate that there is a statistical difference between the variables above 
when the conflict experiences intervention and when the conflict does not. Further analysis was 
done to explore this finding, which is can be found in the following section.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics- Conflict Characteristics 
Intervention  Length (Days)  Intensity  Incompatibility 
No  6361.63 10.4%  45.8%  
Yes  5451.60  26.9%  59.6%  
Total  6243.03  12.5%  47.6%  
Difference 910.03 (886.89) -0.1655** 
(0.0642) 
-0.1379* (0.0737) 
 Standard Errors in Parentheses 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1 
Table 2: Summary Statistics- Region Terms 
Intervention  Middle East  Asia  Africa  Europe  Americas  
No  13.5%  33.2%  35.8%  8.9%  8.02%  
Yes  13.5%  17.3%  44.2%  21.2%  3.8%  
Total  13.5%  31.2%  36.9%  10.5%  7.5%  
Difference -0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.1593*** 
(0.0587) 
-0.08 
(0.0741) 
-0.01227** 
(0.0592) 
0.0417 
(0.306) 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1 
Table 3: Summary Statistics- Political Factors of Conflict and Conflict History 
Intervention  Cold War  Democracy  Cumulative 
Intensity  
War Occurring Within 
Five Years 
No  72.8%  45.8%  48.2%  55.6% 
Yes  53.8%  46.2%  69.2%  32.7% 
Total  70.3%  45.9%  50.9%  52.6% 
Difference 0.1893** 
(0.738) 
0.31 
(0.747) 
-0.2110***   
(0.70) 
0.2293***                
(0.710) 
Standard Errors in Parentheses  
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1 
Table 4: Summary Statistics- Economic Outcome Variables 
 Logged GNI per 
Capita (Change in 
Percentage Points) 
Logged GDP per 
Capita (Change in 
Percentage Points) 
Growth Rate (Change in 
Percentage Points) 
Intervention Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
No 5.35 6.12 6.90 0.25 0.55 1.0 2.05 2.73 3.27 
Yes 5.56 6.65 6.83 0.45 0.88 1.18 0.26 2.74 -0.61 
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Total 5.38 6.17 6.90 0.26 0.58 1.0 1.91 2.73 3.10 
 
Table 5: Summary Statistics- Social Outcome Variables 
 Mortality Rate (Deaths per 1000 
members of Population) 
Life Expectancy (Years) 
Intervention Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
No -15.44 -30.87 -56.99 2.01 3.84 2.22 
Yes -23.92 -46.87 -87.81 2.11 4.78 8.65 
Total -16.18 -32.26 -58.95 2.02 3.92 2.69 
 
Table 6: Summary Statistics- Political Outcome Variables 
 Democracy Level Autocracy Level 
Intervention Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
No 0.34 0.67 1.59 -0.16 -0.6 -1.56 
Yes 0.04 0.63 -0.18 -0.26 -0.37 -1.36 
Total 0.31 0.66 1.48 -0.17 -0.58 -1.55 
 
When Does Intervention Occur? 
 The results from the following regressions can be found in table 7. The conflict occurring 
during the Cold War decreased the likelihood of intervention by 12.6 percentage points (p = 
0.028). The cumulative number of battle deaths being at least 1000 increased the likelihood of 
intervention by 11.2 percentage points (p = 0.008). The conflict occurring in the Americas 
significantly decreased the likelihood of intervention by 13.7 percentage points (p = 0.086) while 
conflicts occurring in Asia and the Middle East decreased the likelihood by 17.3 percentage 
points (p = 0.011) and 16.1 percentage points (p = 0.038), respectively. The other variables did 
not have a significant relationship with the likelihood of intervention.  
 Next, it was examined when democratic states intervene. None of the variables were 
significant predictors of democratic intervention; although, intensity, democracy, and 
incompatibility approached significance. Intensity measuring the conflict as a war increased the 
likelihood of democratic intervention by 9.1 percentage points (p = 0.126), the state being a 
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democracy at the end of the conflict increased the likelihood by 3.9 percentage points (p = 
0.159), and the conflict being fought over the government increased the likelihood of democratic 
intervention by 4.4 percentage points (p = 0.156). 
  Finally, autocratic state’s interventions were examined. The Cold War significantly 
decreased the likelihood of an autocratic intervener by 11.8 percentage points (p = 0.035). The 
cumulative intensity being equal to one increased the likelihood of autocratic intervention by 9.4 
percentage points (p = 0.015). The conflict occurring in the Middle East decreased the likelihood 
of intervention by an autocratic state by 19.4 percentage points (p = 0.006) and if it occurred in 
Asia the likelihood of autocratic intervention decreased by 16.3 percentage points (p = 0.013). 
The rest of the variables were not statistically significant. 
Table 7: Likelihood of Intervention Post-1960 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Intervention Democratic Intervener Autocratic Intervener 
    
Cold War -0.126** -0.0521 -0.118** 
 (0.0570) (0.0484) (0.0557) 
Middle East -0.161** 0.0510 -0.194*** 
 (0.0771) (0.0550) (0.0695) 
Asia -0.173** -0.00117 -0.163** 
 (0.0675) (0.0398) (0.0650) 
Americas -0.137* -0.00431 -0.113 
 (0.0797) (0.0633) (0.0792) 
Africa -0.101 0.0456 -0.0982 
 (0.0673) (0.0438) (0.0641) 
Intensity 0.0942 0.0910 0.0580 
 (0.0672) (0.0592) (0.0599) 
Cumulative 
Intensity 
0.112*** 0.0414 0.0942** 
 (0.0422) (0.0344) (0.0385) 
Democracy 0.0104 0.0392 0.00381 
 (0.0363) (0.0278) (0.0337) 
Incompatibility 0.0558 0.0438 0.0442 
 (0.0380) (0.0308) (0.0339) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.702* -0.0335 0.702* 
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 (0.419) (0.0568) (0.418) 
    
Observations 399 399 399 
R-squared 0.283 0.216 0.284 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1 
 The significance of the Cold War as a predictor of intervention warrants further 
investigation because the motivation for states involved in the Cold War, like the United States 
and Russia, may have changed since the end of the Cold War. 
Post-Cold War 
 Following Fortna (2004), the same analysis that was done above was done using only 
observations after the end of the Cold War, which has 35 cases of intervention and 215 without 
intervention (total of 250). Table 8 shows the results. The conflict occurring in the Middle East 
decreased the likelihood of intervention by 31.2 percentage points (p = 0.001) and if the conflict 
occurred in Asia the likelihood of intervention decreased by 30.2 percentage points (p = 0.000). 
Africa decreased the likelihood of intervention by 18.4 percentage points (p = 0.027) and the 
Americas decreased the likelihood of intervention by 21.9 percentage points (p = 0.087). 
Additionally, intensity indicating that a conflict was a war increased the likelihood of 
intervention by 22.7 percentage points (p = 0.022). The remaining variables were not statistically 
significant.  
 Next, democratic states intervening was analyzed. The only significant predictor of 
democratic intervention was intensity, which found that a conflict being a war increased the 
likelihood of intervention by 15.6 percentage points (p = 0.060). Autocratic interveners were 
then observed. The conflict occurring in the Middle East decreased the likelihood of an 
autocratic state intervening by 31.4 percentage points (p = 0.000), the conflict occurring in Asia 
decreased the likelihood of intervention by 28.4 percentage points (p = 0.000), and the conflict 
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occurring in Africa decreased the likelihood of autocratic intervention by 16.2 percentage points 
(p = 0.048). Meanwhile, a conflict being a war increased the likelihood of autocratic intervention 
by 19.2 percentage points (p = 0.048). The other terms were not statistically significant.  
Table 8: Likelihood of Intervention Post-Cold War 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Intervention Democratic Intervener Autocratic Intervener 
    
Middle East -0.312*** -0.00103 -0.314*** 
 (0.0891) (0.0550) (0.0855) 
Asia -0.302*** -0.0263 -0.284*** 
 (0.0791) (0.0356) (0.0767) 
Americas -0.219* 0.0357 -0.199 
 (0.128) (0.118) (0.127) 
Africa -0.184** 0.0211 -0.162** 
 (0.0824) (0.0444) (0.0800) 
Intensity 0.227** 0.156* 0.192** 
 (0.0984) (0.0826) (0.0969) 
Cumulative 
Intensity 
0.0296 0.000704 0.0401 
 (0.0416) (0.0282) (0.0409) 
Democracy -0.0457 0.00933 -0.0481 
 (0.0434) (0.0303) (0.0424) 
Incompatibility 0.0537 0.0362 0.0474 
 (0.0453) (0.0358) (0.0444) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.180** -0.0277 0.167** 
 (0.0834) (0.0477) (0.0788) 
    
Observations 248 248 248 
R-squared 0.282 0.168 0.276 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Drawing back from the literature review of this paper, the findings by Gilligan and 
Stedman (2003) suggest that the cumulative intensity should have a positive impact on the 
likelihood of peacekeeping missions while Fortna (2004) asserts that peacekeepers go where they 
are most needed. The results from the current analysis support these previous findings. Since 
1960, conflicts that were wars increased the likelihood of intervention and democratic 
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intervention at levels that fell just short of statistical significance, while cumulative intensity had 
a positive effect on the likelihood of intervention and autocratic intervention. In the post-Cold 
War period, the intensity of the conflict became positive and significant for intervention, 
democratic intervention, and autocratic intervention. However, cumulative intensity lost its 
significant relationship with intervention and autocratic intervention. Overall, these results 
support the findings of past literature. It should also be noted that while the two studies 
mentioned above only focused on peacekeeping missions organized by the United Nations, this 
paper included unilateral interventions. Therefore, this study expands the scope of the literature 
to cover interventions as a whole, as opposed to just missions from the United Nations.  
The Effects of Intervention  
Economic Factors 
 Table A in the appendix provides the full results. The difference between the GNI per 
capita of the country at the initial end of the conflict and five, ten, and twenty years later 
experienced decreases of 13.5 percentage points (p = 0.699), 0.6 percentage points (p = 0.984), 
24.3 percentage points (p = 0.536), respectively; though, the relationships were not significant. 
Intervention increased GDP per capita by 0.06 points (p = 0.568) after five years, 0.04 points (p 
= 0.773) after ten years, and 0.30 points (p = 0.219) after twenty years. None of these 
relationships were statistically significant. Intervention decreased the growth rate by 4.24 
percentage points (p = 0.089) after five years, 2.09 percentage points (p = 0.477) after ten years, 
and 6.93 percentage points (p = 0.154) after twenty years. The coefficient was only statistically 
significant after five years. Subsequently, intervention appears to have a slight negative impact 
on economic factors. 
Social Factors 
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 See table 9 for full results. Intervention decreased mortality rate by 4.33 deaths per 1000 
members of the population (p = 0.240) after five years, 9.54 deaths per 1000 (p = 0.169) after ten 
years, and 27.75 deaths per 1000 (p = 0.074) after twenty years; though, only the latter-most 
relationship was significant. Intervention decreased life expectancy by 0.08 years (p = 0.845) 
after five years, increased life expectancy by 0.46 years (p = 0.432) after ten years, and increased 
life expectancy by 1.57 years (p = 0.176) after twenty years. None of the relationships were 
significant. While only one relationship among the social factors was significant, a number of 
others were lingering near significance. Therefore, intervention seems to have a significant effect 
on social factors.  
Table 9: The Effects of Intervention- Social Factors 
 Mortality Rate Life Expectancy 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
       
Intervention -4.331 -9.540 -27.75* -0.0753 0.462 1.571 
 (3.680) (6.918) (15.45) (0.384) (0.587) (1.157) 
Middle East -10.00*** -20.33*** -49.83*** 1.993*** 3.776*** 5.698*** 
 (3.422) (6.258) (11.81) (0.524) (0.855) (1.720) 
Africa -15.30*** -32.21*** -73.46*** 1.328*** 2.582*** 5.000*** 
 (3.057) (5.702) (11.31) (0.470) (0.670) (1.318) 
Asia -10.52*** -21.48*** -49.20*** 1.074** 2.120*** 4.191*** 
 (2.618) (4.905) (9.892) (0.447) (0.634) (1.242) 
Americas -11.07*** -22.26*** -39.80*** 1.133** 2.422*** 3.962** 
 (3.262) (6.577) (11.81) (0.470) (0.732) (1.604) 
Length 0.000369 0.00108*** 0.00169** -2.20e-05 -7.36e-05 -0.000200 
 (0.000225) (0.000410) (0.000719) (3.75e-05) (5.55e-05) (0.000122) 
Cold War 0.448 -1.553 -1.710 -0.198 -0.360 1.667 
 (3.642) (6.762) (14.70) (0.639) (0.979) (2.186) 
Intensity -3.384 -4.250 -6.518 0.0630 -0.0914 -0.411 
 (3.361) (6.324) (10.42) (0.589) (0.941) (1.649) 
Cumulative 
Intensity 
-3.811** -6.834* -2.002 0.560** 0.977** 1.054 
 (1.867) (3.646) (6.834) (0.230) (0.397) (1.053) 
War in Five -3.223* -7.793** -11.06* 0.184 0.447 -0.344 
 (1.895) (3.698) (6.670) (0.271) (0.473) (0.855) 
Incompatibility -1.224 -1.281 1.111 0.188 -0.0326 -0.687 
 (1.932) (3.837) (7.430) (0.243) (0.432) (0.953) 
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Democracy 1.784 1.779 -1.845 -0.165 -0.0761 -0.0151 
 (1.962) (3.721) (6.368) (0.288) (0.448) (0.966) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -12.70** -8.237 15.50 1.629** 2.418** 0.872 
 (6.146) (11.19) (20.72) (0.789) (1.183) (2.522) 
       
Observations 308 275 204 307 280 216 
R-squared 0.409 0.406 0.450 0.268 0.298 0.934 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Political Factors 
 See table B in the appendix for full results. Intervention decreased democracy levels by 
0.57 points (p = 0.212) after five years, increased democracy levels by 0.045 points (p = 0.954) 
after ten years, and led to a 1.17-point (p = 0.320) decrease after twenty years. There was never a 
significant effect. Intervention impacted autocracy levels by -0.15 points (p = 0.696) after five 
years, -0.07 points (p = 0.895) after ten years, and -0.46 points (p = 0.656) after twenty years. 
The results were never significant. Therefore, there is no apparent relationship between 
intervention and political factors. 
Overall, intervention had significant impacts on economic and social factors, while not 
having any effect on political factors. While three was a decrease in growth rate after five years, 
results did not suggest a strong residual effect. Additionally, there was a decrease in mortality 
rate that was significant twenty years after the end of the conflict. 
Additional Relationships6 
Length 
Length increased GNI per capita by 0.005 percentage points (p = 0.098) per day after five 
years, but was not significant during any other time period. For every day the conflict occurred, 
                                                          
6 Only significant relationships within this section were reported. See tables 9, and A and B in the appendix, for the 
full results. 
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the mortality rate increased by an insignificant amount after five years, 0.0012 deaths per 1000 
(p = 0.009) after ten years, and 0.0017 deaths per 1000 (p = 0.020) after twenty years. 
Meanwhile, length decreased democracy levels; although this relationship was only significant 
after twenty years, when length decreased democracy levels by 0.00018 points (p = 0.019) per 
day the conflict occurred.  
Cumulative Intensity 
Cumulative intensity increased GDP per capita after five years at insignificant levels, but 
significantly increased by 20 percentage points (p = 0.088) after ten years and 29.4 percentage 
points (p = 0.097) after twenty years. Additionally, life expectancy increased by 0.56 years (p = 
0.015) after five years, 0.98 years (p = 0.015) after ten years, but was not significant after twenty 
years. Additionally, democracy level significantly increased by 0.55 points (p = 0.076). On the 
other hand, if the cumulative intensity was equal to one, the mortality rate decreased by 3.81 
deaths per 1000 (p = 0.042) after five years, 6.83 deaths per 1000 (p = 0.062) after ten years, but 
was not significant after twenty years.  
Incompatibility 
If the conflict was fought over the government, growth rate increased by 3.98 percentage 
points (p = 0.011) after five years, 6.23 points (p = 0.002) after ten years, and 4.79 points (p = 
0.026) after twenty years. GNI per capita experienced a decrease when conflicts were fought 
over government, with it decreasing by 54.5 percentage points (p = 0.038), but was not 
significant after ten or twenty years. Democracy level also had a negative relationship between 
conflicts that were fought over the government, but the effects were not significant after five and 
twenty years. However, democracy level did significantly decrease by 0.90 points (p = 0.057) 
after ten years.  
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Intensity 
If the conflict was considered a war, growth increased by 6.45 percentage points (p = 
0.063) after five years, 7.44 percentage points (p = 0.045) after ten years, but was not significant 
after twenty years. Meanwhile wars decreased GNI per capita by 68.5 percentage points (p = 
0.059) after twenty years, but there was no significant relationship after five or ten years. 
Cold War  
 Conflicts that occurred during the Cold War had positive impact on democracy levels 
after five years, leading to a 1.39-point (p = 0.010) increase. Meanwhile, the Cold War decreased 
GDP per capita by 25 percentage points (p = 0.052) after ten years, but was not significant after 
five or twenty years. Additionally, autocracy levels decreased by 1.29 points (p = 0.007) after 
five years if the conflict occurred during the Cold War and by 1.06 points (p = 0.067) after ten 
years, but was not significant after twenty years. 
Interaction Terms 
Tables 10 and C and D in the appendix provide full results for this section. 
Length X Intervention 
The interaction between length and intervention increased GDP per capita by an 
additional 0.005 percentage points (p = 0.088) per day after five years, 0.006 percentage points 
(p = 0.202) per day after ten years, and increased GDP per capita by an additional 0.011 
percentage points (p = 0.012) per day after twenty years. However, the relationship after ten 
years was not significant, and the remaining terms had small magnitudes. The interaction term 
increased autocracy levels by an additional 0.0003 points (p = 0.011) per day after five years, 
0.004 points (p = 0.089) per day after ten years, and 0.0003 points (p = 0.358) per day after 
twenty years. The relationships after five and ten years were significant. The interaction term 
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decreased growth rate by an additional 0.003 points (p = 0.023) after twenty years. The 
relationships after five and ten years were not significant. The remaining dependent variables 
were not significant.  
Table 10: Interaction Terms- Economic Factors 
 GNI per capita GDP per capita Growth Rate 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
          
Intervention 0.389 -0.103 -0.159 -0.158 -0.107 -0.0622 -3.959 0.0780 -4.418 
 (0.451) (0.502) (0.574) (0.145) (0.200) (0.250) (2.626) (2.359) (4.320) 
Middle East 0.346 0.526 -0.852* -0.186 -0.197 -0.603** -8.023** -8.737* -9.261* 
 (0.520) (0.484) (0.454) (0.128) (0.184) (0.236) (3.726) (4.738) (5.006) 
Africa -1.707*** -1.929*** -2.885*** -0.235** -0.420*** -0.827*** -5.620 -6.297 -5.315 
 (0.369) (0.397) (0.400) (0.0980) (0.145) (0.193) (3.451) (4.021) (4.239) 
Asia -1.848*** -1.527*** -2.263*** -0.0725 -0.128 -0.408** -5.168 -5.756 -7.405* 
 (0.391) (0.398) (0.389) (0.106) (0.160) (0.203) (3.363) (3.727) (4.135) 
Americas -0.416 0.0801 -0.524 -0.0840 -0.120 -0.556** -4.409 -7.688* -7.233 
 (0.539) (0.505) (0.454) (0.152) (0.190) (0.219) (3.992) (4.641) (4.855) 
Length 5.68e-05* -1.01e-05 8.05e-06 1.44e-06 -1.16e-06 -1.73e-05 -7.96e-05 -5.32e-05 -0.000165 
 (3.04e-05) (2.43e-05) (3.35e-05) (8.55e-06) (1.12e-05) (1.51e-05) (0.000185) (0.000228) (0.000266) 
Cold War -0.0940 -0.324 0.166 -0.0803 -0.270** 0.0162 1.050 1.837 -1.529 
 (0.428) (0.371) (0.524) (0.0852) (0.129) (0.236) (2.788) (3.023) (4.303) 
Intensity -0.190 -0.297 -0.677* -0.0622 -0.203 -0.341* 6.529* 7.558** 1.089 
 (0.350) (0.372) (0.367) (0.0955) (0.125) (0.201) (3.466) (3.703) (4.806) 
Cumint -0.152 0.330 0.140 0.115 0.212* 0.310* -0.904 -1.528 1.468 
 (0.262) (0.231) (0.329) (0.0882) (0.120) (0.180) (1.620) (2.176) (2.577) 
War in Five -0.237 -0.0612 -0.398 -0.0334 -0.0159 -0.177 2.425 3.837* 3.200 
 (0.268) (0.216) (0.255) (0.0566) (0.0840) (0.138) (1.572) (2.172) (2.538) 
Incompatibility -0.518** -0.273 -0.290 -0.0437 -0.0775 -0.0138 4.023*** 6.342*** 4.724** 
 (0.255) (0.225) (0.254) (0.0567) (0.0856) (0.130) (1.543) (1.981) (2.174) 
Democracy 0.121 0.343* 0.446* -0.0247 0.00501 0.152 2.150 2.787 2.273 
 (0.230) (0.197) (0.237) (0.0566) (0.0818) (0.115) (1.465) (1.972) (1.942) 
Length X 
intervention 
-0.000126 3.57e-05 -8.77e-05 4.65e-05* 6.46e-05 0.000109** -0.000368 -0.000948 -0.00308** 
 (0.000103) (9.21e-05) (0.000133) (2.71e-05) (5.05e-05) (4.26e-05) (0.000665) (0.00118) (0.00134) 
Cumulative 
Intensity X 
Intervention 
0.250 -0.0598 1.373 -0.0409 -0.223 -0.310 2.637 3.401 20.75* 
 (0.615) (0.704) (1.321) (0.190) (0.329) (0.478) (4.672) (5.413) (11.76) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 6.346*** 6.705*** 9.479*** 0.612*** 0.938*** 2.251*** -3.703 -2.550 9.322 
 (0.735) (0.700) (0.766) (0.210) (0.302) (0.420) (6.420) (6.479) (8.415) 
          
Observations 198 184 140 267 233 167 291 257 198 
R-squared 0.618 0.680 0.758 0.507 0.633 0.665 0.299 0.276 0.290 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Cumulative Intensity X Intervention  
 The interaction between cumulative intensity and intervention increased growth rate by 
2.64 percentage points (p = 0.573) after five years, 3.40 percentage points (p = 0.530) after ten 
years, and 20.75 percentage points (p = 0.080) after twenty years. Only the relationship after 
twenty years was significant. The interaction term also increased life expectancy by an additional 
0.09 years (p = 0.914) after five years and 0.38 years (p = 0.798) after ten years while causing it 
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to decrease by an additional 4.91 years (p = 0.071) after twenty years. However, only the 
relationship after twenty years was significant and relatively large standard errors could be 
attributed for the sign-change. Additionally, the interaction between cumulative intensity and 
intervention led to a decrease in autocracy levels by an additional 2.02 points (p = 0.048) after 
five years, 1.77 points (p = 0.129) after ten years, and 4.15 points (p = 0.015) after twenty years. 
The relationships after five and twenty years were significant. The remaining effects of the 
interaction and dependent variables were not significant.  
Figure One7: Additional Impact on Interaction Terms on Autocracy Level 
 
The interaction between length and intervention had mixed effects on economic 
variables, with a negative impact on growth rate and positive one GDP per capita. However, the 
coefficients for both of these additional effects were relatively small, equaling zero to the third 
decimal. It had no impact on social terms and there was a marginal impact on political factors. In 
terms of cumulative intensity and intervention, growth rate increased while life expectancy 
                                                          
7 Figure One shows the effects of the two interaction terms over time. Length X Intervention stays virtually at zero, 
showing that even though the results were statistically significant, the magnitude of the effects were weak.  
Significant additional effects were shown with the following symbol: ◊ (a hollowed diamond). Insignificant effects 
were shown with the symbol being filled.  
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decreased. This suggests that while certain factors may benefit from different interactions, others 
may experience the opposite effect.  
The Types of Intervention and Interveners 
 There were 27 instances where the intervener was considered democratic and 42 
autocratic interventions. Intervention in favor of the government occurred 39 times while rebels 
received support on 22 occasions. Finally, the average number of interveners was when 
intervention occurred was 3.23 interveners.  
Regime-Type of the Intervener 
 Full results can be found in tables 11, E and F (appendix). 
Democratic Intervention 
 The interaction between democratic intervention and intervention increased growth rate 
by an additional 7.81 points (p = 0.066) after five years, 9.96 points (p = 0.061) after ten years, 
and 8.84 points (p = 0.300) after twenty years. These relationships were significant except for 
after twenty years.  
 Additionally, democratic intervention decreased GNI per capita by an additional 20.7 
percentage points (p = 0.098) after five years, 67.5 percentage points (p = 0.154) after ten years, 
and 20.7 percentage points (p = 0.708) after twenty years. However, only the relationship after 
five years was significant. Autocracy levels decreased by an additional 1.21 points (p = 0.181) 
after five years, 2.79 points (p = 0.011) after ten years, but increased autocracy levels by 0.90 (p 
= 0.626) after twenty years. However, only the relationship after ten years was significant. The 
remaining dependent variables had no significant relationship with democratic intervention.  
Table 11: The Types of Intervention and Interveners- Economic Factors Regime-Type 
 GNI per capita GDP per capita Growth Rate 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
          
Intervention 0.191 0.934 0.976 0.329 0.413 -0.560 -24.39*** -28.13** -12.62 
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 (1.216) (0.924) (0.897) (0.413) (0.606) (0.635) (7.006) (11.83) (10.04) 
Middle East 0.444 0.415 -0.842* -0.244* -0.219 -0.574** -7.395** -8.094* -9.470* 
 (0.534) (0.484) (0.443) (0.125) (0.184) (0.236) (3.742) (4.608) (5.051) 
Africa -1.576*** -1.956*** -2.873*** -0.269*** -0.425*** -0.834*** -5.756 -6.401 -5.257 
 (0.385) (0.390) (0.402) (0.101) (0.146) (0.194) (3.589) (3.907) (4.275) 
Asia -1.715*** -1.560*** -2.349*** -0.112 -0.144 -0.394* -5.172 -5.587 -7.323* 
 (0.404) (0.390) (0.396) (0.106) (0.160) (0.208) (3.438) (3.599) (4.163) 
Americas -0.310 0.0620 -0.565 -0.114 -0.133 -0.559** -4.306 -7.467 -7.488 
 (0.551) (0.499) (0.445) (0.155) (0.192) (0.221) (4.062) (4.596) (4.881) 
Length 5.04e-05* -7.16e-06 1.23e-06 1.79e-06 8.07e-07 -1.28e-05 -8.64e-05 -8.41e-05 -0.000161 
 (3.00e-05) (2.43e-05) (3.36e-05) (8.47e-06) (1.13e-05) (1.52e-05) (0.000181) (0.000222) (0.000260) 
Cold War -0.0794 -0.258 0.224 -0.0501 -0.237* -0.0233 0.331 0.914 -1.975 
 (0.427) (0.379) (0.524) (0.0827) (0.129) (0.239) (2.825) (3.018) (4.330) 
Intensity -0.0392 -0.250 -0.696* -0.0747 -0.188 -0.339 6.326* 7.134* 0.718 
 (0.367) (0.386) (0.385) (0.0970) (0.130) (0.205) (3.640) (3.952) (4.985) 
Cumulative Intensity -0.179 0.298 0.182 0.109 0.186 0.308* -0.466 -0.989 2.038 
 (0.255) (0.236) (0.334) (0.0851) (0.121) (0.179) (1.521) (2.064) (2.534) 
War in Five -0.291 -0.0807 -0.316 -0.0202 -0.0190 -0.184 2.309 3.840* 2.917 
 (0.276) (0.229) (0.252) (0.0548) (0.0849) (0.141) (1.564) (2.161) (2.566) 
Incompatibility -0.531** -0.299 -0.182 -0.0309 -0.0711 -0.0215 3.767** 6.110*** 4.525** 
 (0.262) (0.233) (0.239) (0.0583) (0.0873) (0.131) (1.585) (1.987) (2.202) 
Democracy 0.123 0.326* 0.493** -0.0232 0.0140 0.149 2.042 2.612 1.639 
 (0.238) (0.196) (0.247) (0.0571) (0.0836) (0.120) (1.436) (1.950) (1.955) 
Democratic Intervener 
X Intervention 
-0.982* -0.675 0.207 0.0347 -0.191 0.472 7.813* 9.964* 8.835 
 (0.589) (0.471) (0.552) (0.167) (0.244) (0.529) (4.231) (5.287) (8.490) 
Autocratic Intervener 
X Intervention 
0.460 -0.0506 1.108* 0.178 0.156 -0.263 4.646 5.674 -22.55** 
 (0.843) (0.645) (0.574) (0.169) (0.209) (0.465) (4.169) (4.969) (8.732) 
Democratic intervener -0.757 -0.0350 -2.005** -0.00843 -0.104 0.946* 2.651 6.335 15.37 
 (0.854) (0.640) (0.791) (0.171) (0.291) (0.506) (5.641) (5.293) (11.86) 
Autocratic intervener 0.683 -0.566  -0.407 -0.307  15.77*** 18.28**  
 (0.968) (0.717)  (0.337) (0.414)  (5.017) (8.402)  
o.Autocratic intervener      -   - 
          
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 6.594*** 6.950*** 7.933*** 0.536** 0.944*** 2.412*** -2.859 -1.623 9.959 
 (0.879) (0.908) (0.798) (0.220) (0.354) (0.469) (6.666) (6.426) (8.442) 
          
Observations 198 184 140 267 233 167 291 257 198 
R-squared 0.621 0.684 0.762 0.510 0.632 0.664 0.315 0.289 0.298 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Autocratic Intervention 
Autocratic intervention increased life expectancy by 0.65 years (p = 0.450) after five 
years, 3.14 years (p = 0.002) after ten years, and 1.33 years (p = 0.575) after twenty years. Only 
the relationship after ten years was significant. Autocratic intervention impacted GNI per capita 
by 46 percentage points (p = 0.586) after five years, -5.1 percentage points (p = 0.938) after ten 
years, and 110.8 percentage points (p = 0.057) after twenty years. Only the relationship after 
twenty years was significant. 
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Figure Two8: Effects of Regime-Type on Growth Rate 
 
Autocratic intervention was significantly related to growth rate only after twenty years, 
where it led to an additional decrease of 22.55 points (p = 0.011). Intervention by autocratic 
regimes decreased democracy levels by an additional 2.48 points (p = 0.030) after five years, 
3.92 points (p = 0.002) after ten years, but increased democracy levels by 10.74 points (p = 
0.000) after twenty years. Interestingly, all of these relationships were significant and standard 
errors were not large enough to have had any obvious effect. Autocratic interveners only had a 
significant relationship with autocracy levels after twenty years, where it led to an additional 
decrease of 9.07 points (p = 0.000). The remaining variables can be found in the appendix 
(Tables E and F), as they did not yield significant results. 
Figure Three9: Impact of Regime-Type on Democracy Level 
                                                          
8 Figure Two shows that democratic intervention’s additional effect on growth rate is positive after five and ten 
years, leading to net gains in growth rate. Autocratic intervention had no effect after five and ten years, but lead to a 
sharp decrease in growth rate after twenty years. 
Significant additional effects were shown with the following symbol: ◊ (a hollowed diamond). Insignificant effects 
were shown with the symbol being filled. 
9 Figure Three shows the change in direction that democracy level experiences from the additional impact of 
autocratic intervention. Not only do democracy levels increase after twenty years, but the net additional effect is 
positive, as well.  Meanwhile democratic intervention had no significant additional impact on democracy levels. 
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Democratic intervention appears to have a positive impact on economic factors. 
However, its results suggest that the effects from autocratic intervention are negative. This type 
of intervention can create contradictory effects on economic terms, while also having interesting 
relationships with political variables. Autocratic intervention increases life expectancy while 
decreasing growth rate. Its impact on democracy level is negative five and ten years after the end 
of the conflict, but leads to an increase in democracy level after twenty years. 
Recipient of Intervention  
Full results can be found in the appendix (Tables G, H, and I). 
Support for the Government (Side A)  
Interventions that were in favor of the government increased GNI per capita by an 
additional 32.3 percentage points (p = 0.724) after five years, 41.4 percentage points (p = 0.463) 
after ten years, and 244.3 percentage points (p = 0.000) after twenty years. Only the relationship 
after twenty years was significant. Support for the government decreased GDP per capita by an 
                                                          
Significant additional effects were shown with the following symbol: ◊ (a hollowed diamond). Insignificant effects 
were shown with the symbol being filled. 
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additional 47.3 percentage points (p = 0.036) after five years, but did not have significant 
impacts on this term after ten or twenty years. The remaining terms were not significant. 
Support for Rebels (Side B) 
Rebel support increased GNI per capita by an additional 81.3 percentage points (p = 
0.281) after five years, 100.8 percentage points (p = 0.063) after ten years, and 46.4 percentage 
points (p = 0.502) after twenty years. Only the relationship after ten years was significant. 
Additionally, it increased democracy levels after five years by an additional 0.48 points (p = 
0.531), 0.63 points (p = 0.641) after ten years, and but decreased democracy levels by 3.19 points 
(p = 0.079) after twenty years.  Only the relationship after twenty years was significant. The 
remaining results did not have significant outcomes. 
 Results found that social and political factors were not strongly related to the recipient of 
intervention while economic factors seemed to have a more substantial relationship. Support for 
either side appeared to increase democracy levels while support for the government led to a 
decrease in GDP per capita. GNI per capita experienced a sizable additional increase after twenty 
years. 
Number of Interveners  
 Tables J, K, and L (appendix) provide the full results of this section. 
The interaction between the number of interveners and intervention increased growth by 
an additional 0.91 percentage points (p = 0.003) after five years, 0.34 percentage points (p = 
0.355) after ten years, and led to a decrease in growth rate by an additional 0.858 percentage 
points (p = 0.838) after twenty years. However, only the relationship after five years was 
significant. The number of interveners increased mortality rate by an additional 0.77 deaths per 
1000 (p = 0.145) per intervener after five years, 1.30 deaths per 1000 (p = 0.099) per intervener 
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after ten years, and 3.29 deaths per 1000 (p = 0.804) per intervener after twenty years. Only the 
relationship after ten years was significant, though the effects after five years neared the 10% 
level of significance. There was also an increase in democracy levels by an additional 0.22 points 
(p = 0.000) per intervener after five years, 0.34 points (p = 0.000) per intervener after ten years, 
and 0.22 points (p = 0.773) per intervener after twenty years. These relationships were 
significant after five and ten years, but was not after twenty years. 
The additional impact of the number of interveners decreased GDP per capita by 2.0 
percentage points (p = 0.112) per intervener after five years, 2.8 percentage points (p = 0.077) 
per intervener after ten years, but increased GDP per capita after twenty years by an additional 
11.2 percentage points (p = 0.661). However, this latter relationship was never significant. 
Additionally, the relationship after five years fell just short of significance. The number of 
interveners had a significant negative effect on autocracy levels of an additional 0.28 points (p = 
0.000) per intervener after five years, 0.23 points (p = 0.000) per intervener after ten years, and 
increased after twenty years at insignificant levels. The remaining results were not significant. 
 While the effects of the number of interveners on economic factors are mixed, there 
appears to be an increase in democracy levels and a decrease in autocracy levels. However, an 
increase in mortality rate is also present, further adding to the conflicting outcomes between the 
different factors. 
The Location of the Intervening State 
 The Intervening state neighbored the state in conflict 34 times while the intervener was 
from the same region a total of 42 times. See tables M-R (appendix) for the full results of the 
following analyses. 
Neighboring Intervention 
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 Intervention coming from a neighboring country increased GDP per capita by an 
additional 30.7 percentage points (p = 0.042) after five years, 39.8 percentage points (p = 0.115) 
after ten years, and 90.5 percentage points (p = 0.012) after twenty years. The relationships after 
five and twenty years were significant. Democracy levels also increased by an additional 45.4 
percentage points (p = 0.021) after twenty years, while the relationships after five and ten years 
were not significant. Meanwhile, life expectancy decreased when a neighboring country 
intervened by an additional 1.13 years (p = 0.070) after five years, 1.89 years (p = 0.064) after 
ten years, and 3.96 years (p = 0.073) after twenty years.  
Figure Four10: Heterogeneous Effects on Life Expectancy 
 
Regional Intervention 
 When a country that was located within the same region intervened, GDP per capita 
increased by an additional 33.7 percentage points (p = 0.017) after five years, 68.6 percentage 
                                                          
10 Figure four shows that neighboring intervention leads to a steady additional decrease in life expectancy over the 
three time periods. Meanwhile, autocratic intervention increases life expectancy after ten years before it begins to 
decrease after twenty years at insignificant levels. 
Significant additional effects were shown with the following symbol: ◊ (a hollowed diamond). Insignificant effects 
were shown with the symbol being filled. 
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points (p = 0.002) after ten years, and 95.8 percentage points (p = 0.007) after twenty years. All 
relationships were significant. On the other hand, GNI per capita decreased by an additional 
141.3 percentage points (p = 0.072) after twenty years. The relationships after five and ten years 
were not significant. Additionally, intervention by a state within the region decreased mortality 
rate by an additional 9.91 deaths per 1000 (p = 0.081) after five years, but effects after ten and 
twenty years were not significant.  
Neighboring countries intervening in a civil war appears to increase economic factors 
while also causing an increase in political factors in the long run. However, there were negative 
effects on life expectancy that were significant and residual. Intervention by a country within the  
Figure Five11: Effects of Location of Intervener on GDP per Capita  
 
                                                          
11 Figure five shows that both neighboring intervention and regional intervention both increase GDP per capita over 
the three time periods and the net additional increases are similar. However, regional intervention leads to a steadier 
increase, while regional intervention experiences most of the additional increase after twenty years. 
Significant additional effects were shown with the following symbol: ◊ (a hollowed diamond). Insignificant effects 
were shown with the symbol being filled. 
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same region had mixed effects on economic factors, as it increased GDP per capita but decreased 
GNI per capita. Regional intervention also appeared to have a positive impact on social factors 
since mortality rate decreased. 
Discussion 
The effects of intervention on economic, social, and political factors was mixed, with 
different interaction terms leading to different effects. In terms of economic development, there 
was a negative relationship with growth in the short term (after five years); however, there was 
no lasting effects, as the relationships ten and twenty years after the end of the conflict were 
insignificant. Additionally, the relationship was only significant at the 10% level, making the 
overall substantive significance of the relationship questionable. Therefore, the hypothesis that 
intervention would have an effect on economic factors was rejected.  
However, intervention’s effects change when heterogeneous effects were accounted for. The 
additional effects of length on economic factors significantly increased GDP per capita and 
decreased the growth rate in the long-term outlook (twenty years after the end of the conflict). 
The finding regarding growth rate contradicts those of Koubi (2005) and Collier (1999), who 
investigated the relationship between war and economic growth without taking intervention into 
account. The difference in direction of this relationship between the current study and the ones 
from the two authors suggest that intervention can diminish some of the ‘good’ that comes from 
conflict. In terms of the difference in GDP per capita’s sign compared to growth rate, the 
variable’s small coefficients paired with a small sample of observations that experienced 
intervention could explain the lack of consensus. In other words, while there may be a 
statistically significant relationship between the additional impact of length and intervention on 
GDP per capita, the substantive significance is low. The interaction between cumulative intensity 
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and intervention had a positive additional impact on growth, which did coincide with the 
findings by Koubi (2005). Therefore, while the outcome of the interaction between length and 
intervention on was either too small in magnitude or had a negative relationship, causing the 
hypothesis that there would be a positive relationship between the interaction involving length on 
economic factors to be rejected, the interaction between cumulative intensity and intervention 
was not rejected. 
 Autocratic intervention led to a decrease in growth rate after twenty years, while democratic 
intervention increased growth. This suggests that the regime-type does matter when it comes to 
economic development. Intervention in support for the government decreased growth in the short 
run, but there were little residual effects. However, GNI per capita experienced a sizable increase 
after twenty years, by which time the negative impact on growth had already disappeared. On the 
other hand, support for the rebels had no additional impact on economic factors. Pickering and 
Kisangani (2006) found similar results in terms of the effects of support for the government on 
economic growth; though, their analysis was limited to non-democratic states. 
The interaction between the number of interveners and intervention led to a small decrease in 
GDP per capita, which was only significant at the 10% level, and an increase in growth. 
Therefore, it appears that the positive effects of growth outweigh the negative impact on GDP 
per capita. These results help to expand those of Krain (2005), who used this interaction to find 
that the number of interveners decreases severity of politicides and genocides, to show that it can 
be beneficial for economic factors, as well.  
Neighboring interveners and regional interveners both increased GDP per capita while 
regional interveners also led to an additional decrease in GNI per capita. No previous research 
has been done regarding the effects of this type of intervention; however, it is interesting that it 
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appears to have economic benefits when a local state gets involved in a civil conflict. Based on 
the findings discussed above, all hypotheses regarding intervention characteristics, except for 
those regarding the recipient of intervention, were not rejected. 
Intervention also had significant effects on social factors. Mortality rate decreased after 
twenty years, suggesting that intervention improves this category of variables in the long term, 
causing a failure to reject the hypothesis that intervention would have an effect on social 
development. Further analysis was conducted using interaction terms. It was found that while 
most heterogeneous effects were insignificant, autocratic intervention led to an increase in life 
expectancy while the number of interveners improved both aspects of social development 
(decrease in mortality rate and an increase in life expectancy). The significant and beneficial 
effect of the number of interveners on social factors once again strengthens the findings made by 
Krain (2005). Additionally, while the literature had previously found a significant positive effect 
between government support and an increase in quality of life (Pickering and Kisangani 2006), 
this relationship was not present in the current results.  
Intervention by a neighboring state decreased life expectancy while regional intervention 
decreased mortality rate. This could suggest that regional intervention is more beneficial to the 
state in conflict than neighboring states. It would be difficult to determine why this could be the 
case, especially since there is no previous research to guide these findings and also because 
neighboring interventions are also counted as regional interventions. However, one possibility is 
that a regional state has less of a possibility to capture and control parts of the state in conflict 
than a neighboring state would. This would make a regional power more interested in influence, 
which makes it more interested in the wellbeing of country. 
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Based on the findings that were mentioned above, the hypotheses that length and cumulative 
intensity would have a positive effect on social development, that the recipient of the 
intervention, and democratic intervention would have an effect on social factors were rejected. 
Meanwhile the hypotheses that there would be a significant effect from the interaction terms 
regarding autocratic intervention, number of interveners, and the location of the interveners were 
not rejected. 
Results from the initial analysis regarding intervention and political factors found that no 
significant relationship was present, causing a rejection of the hypothesis stating there would be 
an effect. However, interaction terms showed the significance of heterogeneous effects on 
democracy and autocracy levels. The length of the conflict’s interaction with intervention 
showed an increase in autocracy levels; however, the magnitudes of the effects were small. 
Conversely, cumulative intensity led to an additional decrease in autocracy levels. Therefore, 
both the hypotheses predicting a positive relationship between these two interactions and the 
political factors were rejected. The former was not supported because the magnitude was too 
small, especially when considering the levels of significance, and the latter was rejected since the 
opposite effect was present. Once again, the number of interveners appeared to benefit the 
country the conflict took place in, as it increased democracy levels and decreased autocracy 
levels. Democratic interveners decreased autocracy levels, though they did not improve 
democracy levels. This lack of effect on democracy levels is consistent with the literature (de 
Mesquita and Downs 2006). Finally, this study found that while autocratic interveners decrease 
democracy levels in the short term, it leads to an increase in democracy levels after twenty years. 
The net effects also appeared to be positive. Additionally, the relationship was significant to at 
least the 5% level in all three time periods. These results stand in contrast with Gleditsch et al. 
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(2004) and de Mesquita and Downs (2006), who found negative and insignificant effects, 
respectively. Because of the results stated above, only the hypothesis regarding the government 
being the recipient of intervention was rejected, while the results from the study led to the 
remaining hypotheses not being rejected. 
Overall, there were a number of major findings within this paper that contributed to the 
literature. First, the results furthered the argument made by Eckstein and Gurr (1975) that 
democracy levels and autocracy levels should not be seen on the same scale. The results found 
that these two variables did not always respond inversely with each other, suggesting that they do 
not work is if they were just two ends of a scale. A second important finding is the beneficial 
effects of the number of interveners on all types of development. One possible explanation is that 
some of these observations could be reflecting intervention organized by an international body, 
like the United Nations. However, even if this were the case, results from Kim (2015) found that 
intervention by United Nations forces were beneficial in terms of quality of life. Therefore, the 
cost of not accounting for these results potentially being a reflection of United Nations forces is 
low. Additionally, the location of the intervener in terms of being a neighboring state or a 
country within the same region, which had not previously been examined, had a significant effect 
on developmental factors; however, further analysis is needed in order to ensure these findings 
are robust. Finally, this study investigated the effects of the regime-type of the intervener on 
post-war development. While past research has mainly focused on its effects on democratization, 
this study looked at its effects on economic, social, and political factors in order to widen the 
scope of research on the impact of democratic and autocratic intervention. One of the more 
notable findings from this section of the analysis, was the relationship between the additional 
effect of autocratic interveners on democracy levels. Previous literature’s assertion that 
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autocracies intervening leads to autocratization was not only not supported, but the opposite 
relationship was found when looking at the long term. Democracy levels were negatively 
impacted after five and ten years, but only after twenty years did the relationship turn positive. It 
is possible that the past literature only saw a snapshot of the effects because they did not allow 
for the relationship to develop for a long enough period of time.  
Conclusion 
 The overall hypothesis of this paper was that the impact of intervention, with all effects 
considered, would have a negative impact on development. However, this study found that the 
answer to whether intervention does not result in a clear answer. Like the study’s theory 
suggests, there were certain aspects of the characteristics of interventions that helped and others 
that hindered the economic, social, and political factors that were analyzed in this paper. What is 
clear, however, is that intervention characteristics matter when it comes to interventions effects 
on development, with different characteristics impacting the three development factors in 
different manners. For example, autocratic intervention can increase social and political factors, 
but at the expense of economic growth. This leads to important policy implications for the study. 
When a government is deciding whether it should intervene, it is important that it considers what 
developmental factors are important to them and how their own regime-type will have an impact 
on the possibility of the target country of benefiting in that developmental area. The United 
States, for example, should intervene if its post-war goal is to improve economic growth; 
however, if it wishes to improve social factors or promote democracy, its intervention will have 
no significant effect. Therefore, the United States would likely be better off not intervening since 
it would experience the cost of war while not influencing the factors that it desired. 
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 There were a number of limitations within this study. First, the number of observations of 
conflicts that experienced intervention was low. While there was a total of 52 observations with 
intervention, this number varied when looking at the different time periods. This could have led 
to results that were partially biased. Additionally, this paper did not differentiate between 
unilateral intervention and that done by United Nations forces. However, while this was done by 
a number of studies in the literature, it is not standard practice to do so. Another limitation to this 
study was that a selection bias was present for observations that experienced intervention so that 
not all conflicts had the same chance of experiencing intervention. This selection bias is an 
inherent issue when examining intervention; however, this study attempted to minimize its 
impact by using fixed effects for both year and region.  
 Future studies should further investigate the impact that the regime-type of the intervener 
has on post-war development. Results from this study are do not fully coincide with past studies, 
requiring further research to be done in order to allow for a better understanding of these effects. 
Additionally, the impact of the number of interveners should be analyzed further. Other than 
Krain (2005), who inspired the inclusion of this term in the current study, there have not been 
any other studies that have used this interaction. The results suggest that it is an important factor 
for all aspects of development. Subsequently, more research should be done on it to provide a 
more robust understanding of its impact. 
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Appendix: 
 
Table A: The Effects of Intervention Economic Factors  
 GNI per capita GDP per capita Growth Rate 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten  Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
          
Intervention -0.135 0.00657 0.243 0.0587 0.0429 0.299 -4.243* -2.087 -6.930 
 (0.349) (0.335) (0.392) (0.103) (0.149) (0.242) (2.482) (2.929) (4.833) 
Middle East 0.350 0.529 -0.895** -0.191 -0.182 -0.578** -8.149** -8.988* -10.27** 
 (0.501) (0.469) (0.445) (0.131) (0.187) (0.235) (3.693) (4.669) (4.936) 
Africa -1.673*** -1.935*** -2.874*** -0.245** -0.415*** -0.829*** -5.671* -6.456* -5.298 
 (0.368) (0.384) (0.394) (0.0969) (0.144) (0.191) (3.420) (3.880) (4.197) 
Asia -1.790*** -1.544*** -2.257*** -0.0921 -0.134 -0.415** -5.183 -5.754 -7.426* 
 (0.393) (0.385) (0.383) (0.104) (0.157) (0.202) (3.331) (3.634) (4.087) 
Americas -0.379 0.0693 -0.565 -0.0949 -0.121 -0.552** -4.466 -7.789* -7.706 
 (0.533) (0.494) (0.441) (0.152) (0.188) (0.216) (3.964) (4.577) (4.802) 
Length 4.96e-05* -8.11e-06 9.17e-06 3.20e-06 1.49e-06 -1.38e-05 -9.20e-05 -8.37e-05 -0.000207 
 (2.98e-05) (2.45e-05) (3.32e-05) (8.69e-06) (1.14e-05) (1.48e-05) (0.000183) (0.000227) (0.000264) 
Cold War -0.171 -0.311 0.142 -0.0555 -0.248* 0.00232 0.885 1.508 -1.412 
 (0.423) (0.368) (0.518) (0.0828) (0.127) (0.234) (2.760) (2.927) (4.270) 
Intensity -0.190 -0.294 -0.685* -0.0595 -0.196 -0.307 6.451* 7.443** 0.363 
 (0.349) (0.370) (0.358) (0.0968) (0.126) (0.200) (3.458) (3.688) (4.739) 
Cumulative 
Intensity 
-0.125 0.325 0.175 0.113 0.200* 0.294* -0.689 -1.336 2.063 
 (0.247) (0.227) (0.329) (0.0831) (0.116) (0.176) (1.524) (2.049) (2.551) 
War in Five -0.277 -0.0543 -0.387 -0.0137 -0.00544 -0.163 2.403 3.746* 3.280 
 (0.268) (0.213) (0.252) (0.0540) (0.0819) (0.135) (1.565) (2.149) (2.529) 
Incompatibility -0.545** -0.267 -0.252 -0.0305 -0.0669 -0.00147 3.980** 6.228*** 4.792** 
 (0.261) (0.223) (0.239) (0.0566) (0.0849) (0.126) (1.543) (1.958) (2.133) 
Democracy 0.124 0.347* 0.439* -0.0227 0.0136 0.154 2.092 2.649 2.105 
 (0.230) (0.194) (0.233) (0.0574) (0.0834) (0.115) (1.465) (1.974) (1.942) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 6.802*** 6.621*** 8.979*** 0.418** 0.812*** 1.995*** -3.531 -1.988 9.136 
 (0.722) (0.646) (0.565) (0.197) (0.274) (0.387) (6.347) (6.331) (8.245) 
          
Observations 198 184 140 267 233 167 291 257 198 
R-squared 0.612 0.680 0.755 0.494 0.627 0.659 0.298 0.272 0.279 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table B: The Effects of Intervention Political Factors  
 Democracy Level Autocracy Level 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
       
Intervention -0.571 0.0447 -1.171 -0.149 -0.0697 -0.461 
 (0.457) (0.768) (1.174) (0.382) (0.530) (1.034) 
middle East -1.722*** -2.181*** -2.129* 0.653 1.023 0.439 
 (0.599) (0.771) (1.117) (0.587) (0.726) (1.025) 
Africa -1.395** -1.186 -2.095* -0.0424 -0.204 -0.501 
 (0.614) (0.851) (1.118) (0.542) (0.672) (0.800) 
Asia -1.459*** -2.117*** -1.367 0.342 0.891 -0.403 
 (0.498) (0.720) (0.994) (0.428) (0.566) (0.717) 
Americas 0.574 0.640 0.635 -0.215 -0.377 -0.725 
 (0.708) (0.855) (1.197) (0.630) (0.645) (0.917) 
Length -4.79e-05 -6.36e-05 -0.000181** 4.58e-05 4.89e-05 7.56e-05 
 (4.08e-05) (5.45e-05) (7.64e-05) (3.67e-05) (4.84e-05) (6.21e-05) 
Cold War 1.392** 0.841 0.848 -1.287*** -1.064* -1.261 
 (0.537) (0.688) (1.045) (0.475) (0.578) (0.843) 
Intensity -0.00116 -0.517 -1.036 -0.147 -0.0690 0.113 
 (0.405) (0.681) (0.880) (0.419) (0.601) (0.789) 
Cumulative 
Intensity 
0.552* 0.689 0.820 -0.423 -0.472 -0.179 
 (0.309) (0.524) (0.900) (0.265) (0.419) (0.718) 
War in Five 0.403 0.0272 0.448 -0.148 -0.0475 -0.253 
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 (0.316) (0.487) (0.603) (0.296) (0.377) (0.537) 
Incompatibility -0.225 -0.904* -0.437 0.157 0.479 0.133 
 (0.344) (0.473) (0.610) (0.310) (0.419) (0.575) 
Democracy -1.596*** -2.417*** -3.217*** 1.209*** 1.510*** 2.950*** 
 (0.336) (0.419) (0.552) (0.288) (0.337) (0.441) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.165 -0.582 0.875 0.502 0.522 -0.0732 
 (1.396) (1.872) (1.663) (1.015) (0.993) (1.385) 
       
Observations 275 234 174 275 234 174 
R-squared 0.331 0.403 0.435 0.283 0.395 0.466 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table C: Interaction Terms- Social Factors  
 Mortality Rate Life Expectancy 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
       
Intervention 1.494 0.670 -18.89 -0.509 -0.303 2.409 
 (6.433) (11.15) (16.88) (0.853) (1.132) (1.632) 
Middle East -10.76*** -21.57*** -50.68*** 2.007*** 3.808*** 5.600*** 
 (3.395) (6.275) (11.88) (0.520) (0.857) (1.752) 
Africa -15.67*** -33.00*** -72.96*** 1.348*** 2.602*** 5.045*** 
 (3.092) (5.718) (11.41) (0.466) (0.667) (1.332) 
Asia -10.95*** -22.43*** -48.64*** 1.118** 2.196*** 4.261*** 
 (2.638) (4.918) (9.926) (0.442) (0.638) (1.246) 
Americas -11.49*** -23.16*** -40.21*** 1.161** 2.468*** 3.971** 
 (3.317) (6.673) (11.91) (0.470) (0.736) (1.614) 
Length 0.000340 0.00106** 0.00164** -2.48e-05 -7.87e-05 -0.000208* 
 (0.000224) (0.000410) (0.000723) (3.80e-05) (5.59e-05) (0.000124) 
Cold War 0.464 -1.442 -1.882 -0.218 -0.395 1.675 
 (3.745) (6.862) (14.88) (0.640) (0.985) (2.195) 
Intensity -3.519 -4.387 -6.485 0.0692 -0.0805 -0.396 
 (3.370) (6.333) (10.57) (0.591) (0.945) (1.648) 
Cumint -2.627 -5.202 -0.355 0.540** 0.931** 1.196 
 (1.847) (3.647) (7.010) (0.225) (0.401) (1.066) 
War in Five -2.761 -7.188* -10.63 0.163 0.409 -0.366 
 (1.938) (3.732) (6.744) (0.274) (0.477) (0.862) 
Incompatibility -0.887 -0.749 2.142 0.177 -0.0618 -0.614 
 (1.970) (3.851) (7.363) (0.250) (0.439) (0.970) 
Democracy 1.635 1.757 -1.595 -0.169 -0.0825 -0.00335 
 (1.970) (3.732) (6.444) (0.288) (0.449) (0.974) 
Length X 
intervention 
0.000376 0.000111 0.00249 9.14e-05 0.000132 0.000506 
 (0.000860) (0.00177) (0.00616) (8.16e-05) (0.000139) (0.000383) 
Cumulative 
Intensity X 
Intervention 
-12.86 -18.09 -34.82 0.0918 0.377 -4.912* 
 (10.27) (17.78) (41.70) (0.850) (1.474) (2.704) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -18.63** -18.22 2.668 1.817* 2.779** 0.0845 
 (8.185) (14.32) (21.29) (0.959) (1.403) (2.581) 
       
Observations 308 275 204 307 280 216 
R-squared 0.418 0.412 0.454 0.271 0.302 0.934 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table D: Interaction Terms- Political Factors 
 Democracy Level Autocracy Level 
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VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
       
Intervention -0.164 0.716 -1.600 -0.147 -0.279 0.328 
 (0.739) (1.127) (2.005) (0.526) (0.720) (1.699) 
Middle East -1.756*** -2.211*** -2.141* 0.637 0.963 0.326 
 (0.603) (0.771) (1.138) (0.591) (0.731) (1.045) 
Africa -1.418** -1.197 -2.146* -0.0258 -0.246 -0.441 
 (0.618) (0.848) (1.137) (0.547) (0.678) (0.825) 
Asia -1.515*** -2.145*** -1.384 0.377 0.871 -0.415 
 (0.503) (0.720) (1.005) (0.436) (0.574) (0.724) 
Americas 0.520 0.616 0.596 -0.152 -0.328 -0.652 
 (0.714) (0.862) (1.204) (0.622) (0.641) (0.902) 
Length -4.49e-05 -6.21e-05 -0.000183** 4.01e-05 4.47e-05 7.29e-05 
 (4.10e-05) (5.50e-05) (7.71e-05) (3.69e-05) (4.89e-05) (6.26e-05) 
Cold War 1.480*** 0.856 0.866 -1.410*** -1.161* -1.277 
 (0.545) (0.711) (1.053) (0.484) (0.592) (0.845) 
Intensity 0.0319 -0.489 -1.080 -0.218 -0.0941 -0.0198 
 (0.404) (0.691) (0.905) (0.402) (0.605) (0.799) 
Cumint 0.503 0.732 0.785 -0.265 -0.376 0.0228 
 (0.332) (0.540) (0.922) (0.285) (0.443) (0.732) 
War in Five 0.457 0.0612 0.431 -0.181 -0.0654 -0.260 
 (0.325) (0.491) (0.609) (0.305) (0.385) (0.546) 
Incompatibility -0.183 -0.863* -0.435 0.125 0.425 0.181 
 (0.342) (0.478) (0.614) (0.310) (0.419) (0.577) 
Democracy -1.590*** -2.416*** -3.208*** 1.189*** 1.506*** 2.913*** 
 (0.337) (0.419) (0.559) (0.289) (0.338) (0.442) 
Length X 
intervention 
-0.000209 -0.000150 0.000194 0.000281** 0.000370* 0.000324 
 (0.000139) (0.000330) (0.000399) (0.000110) (0.000217) (0.000352) 
Cumulative 
Intensity X 
Intervention 
0.773 -0.378 -0.148 -2.021** -1.773 -4.148** 
 (1.162) (2.180) (1.766) (1.014) (1.162) (1.683) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.937 -0.903 1.017 0.527 0.648 -0.654 
 (1.383) (2.084) (1.778) (1.114) (1.042) (1.548) 
       
Observations 275 234 174 275 234 174 
R-squared 0.337 0.405 0.436 0.300 0.402 0.476 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table E: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Social Factors – Regime-Type 
 Mortality Rate Life Expectancy 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
       
Intervention -13.89 -25.25 -9.639 -0.738 -1.234 5.130 
 (12.77) (22.95) (31.99) (1.212) (1.841) (3.831) 
Middle East -9.291*** -19.34*** -50.04*** 2.019*** 3.867*** 5.723*** 
 (3.470) (6.387) (11.99) (0.558) (0.880) (1.729) 
Africa -15.22*** -32.17*** -74.51*** 1.335** 2.612*** 5.085*** 
 (3.137) (5.759) (11.41) (0.518) (0.702) (1.326) 
Asia -10.30*** -21.28*** -50.97*** 1.085** 2.175*** 4.189*** 
 (2.650) (4.905) (9.965) (0.481) (0.648) (1.248) 
Americas -10.71*** -21.68*** -39.65*** 1.141** 2.430*** 3.909** 
 (3.281) (6.588) (11.75) (0.480) (0.735) (1.619) 
Length 0.000377* 0.00109*** 0.00174** -2.15e-05 -7.22e-05 -0.000199 
 (0.000229) (0.000416) (0.000723) (3.74e-05) (5.50e-05) (0.000123) 
Cold War 0.104 -1.931 -1.644 -0.190 -0.339 1.719 
 (3.718) (6.866) (14.78) (0.655) (1.007) (2.193) 
Intensity -3.474 -4.714 -5.898 0.0914 0.0344 -0.204 
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 (3.429) (6.494) (10.60) (0.620) (0.995) (1.739) 
Cumulative Intensity -3.751** -6.549* -2.633 0.540** 0.879** 0.991 
 (1.826) (3.646) (6.818) (0.236) (0.413) (1.065) 
War in Five -3.133 -7.251* -9.899 0.172 0.375 -0.272 
 (1.929) (3.814) (6.802) (0.279) (0.485) (0.862) 
Incompatibility -1.243 -1.188 1.721 0.180 -0.0516 -0.598 
 (1.982) (3.907) (7.514) (0.256) (0.447) (0.974) 
Democracy 1.791 1.684 -2.425 -0.163 -0.0490 0.0582 
 (1.963) (3.746) (6.585) (0.293) (0.451) (0.998) 
Democratic Intervener X 
Intervention 
8.204 15.64 24.65 -0.211 -0.992 -2.361 
 (7.149) (12.31) (25.61) (0.655) (1.109) (2.985) 
Autocratic Intervener X 
Intervention 
3.251 -2.610 -8.043 0.648 3.141*** 1.334 
 (6.893) (11.63) (24.71) (0.857) (0.991) (2.374) 
Democratic intervener -3.347 0.744 -27.59 -0.0938 -1.350 -4.196 
 (6.518) (13.93) (25.76) (1.045) (1.589) (2.985) 
Autocratic intervener 9.399 13.15  0.825 2.657**  
 (10.54) (17.49)  (0.880) (1.235)  
o.autocraticintervener   -   - 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -20.62** -21.15 -25.63 1.650 2.410* 0.0168 
 (8.259) (15.51) (23.16) (1.020) (1.423) (2.728) 
       
Observations 308 275 204 307 280 216 
R-squared 0.423 0.419 0.463 0.269 0.305 0.934 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table F: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Political Factors – Regime-Type 
 Democracy Level Autocracy Level 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
       
Intervention -0.112 -0.598 -0.0638 2.771** 4.958* -2.716 
 (1.630) (2.867) (2.492) (1.309) (2.533) (2.195) 
Middle East -1.713*** -2.269*** -2.053* 0.657 1.087 0.366 
 (0.621) (0.775) (1.110) (0.604) (0.732) (1.051) 
Africa -1.397** -1.219 -2.020* 0.0436 -0.111 -0.604 
 (0.641) (0.852) (1.116) (0.574) (0.682) (0.811) 
Asia -1.456*** -2.137*** -1.354 0.405 0.967* -0.323 
 (0.514) (0.707) (0.981) (0.447) (0.568) (0.717) 
Americas 0.612 0.699 0.437 -0.203 -0.341 -0.530 
 (0.721) (0.846) (1.190) (0.638) (0.643) (0.894) 
Length -4.84e-05 -6.71e-05 -0.000189** 4.40e-05 4.59e-05 7.91e-05 
 (4.14e-05) (5.49e-05) (7.80e-05) (3.69e-05) (4.87e-05) (6.29e-05) 
Cold War 1.358** 0.767 0.968 -1.245** -1.023* -1.364 
 (0.546) (0.697) (1.058) (0.485) (0.588) (0.857) 
Intensity -0.0925 -0.874 -1.238 -0.0176 0.201 0.209 
 (0.389) (0.663) (0.887) (0.384) (0.613) (0.791) 
Cumulative Intensity 0.607* 0.844 0.756 -0.435 -0.481 -0.0732 
 (0.314) (0.540) (0.919) (0.268) (0.433) (0.730) 
War in Five 0.460 0.237 0.280 -0.189 -0.156 -0.208 
 (0.330) (0.499) (0.629) (0.311) (0.395) (0.563) 
Incompatibility -0.245 -0.877* -0.249 0.220 0.479 -0.00253 
 (0.351) (0.476) (0.605) (0.317) (0.425) (0.575) 
Democracy -1.598*** -2.391*** -3.011*** 1.229*** 1.518*** 2.810*** 
 (0.337) (0.418) (0.545) (0.290) (0.342) (0.426) 
Democratic Intervener X 
Intervention 
0.123 1.976 -1.323 -1.210 -2.789** 0.895 
 (1.016) (1.460) (2.353) (0.902) (1.088) (1.834) 
Autocratic Intervener X -2.484** -3.917*** 10.74*** -0.0830 -0.524 -9.070*** 
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Intervention 
 (1.137) (1.251) (2.634) (1.069) (0.910) (1.716) 
Democratic intervener 1.574 4.050** -9.346*** -1.451 -2.788*** 10.37*** 
 (1.471) (1.818) (2.970) (1.377) (0.962) (2.419) 
Autocratic intervener -0.832 -1.986  -2.005** -2.422  
 (0.961) (1.876)  (0.828) (1.762)  
o.autocraticintervener   -   - 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.316 -0.299 0.616 0.482 0.539 0.901 
 (1.560) (1.744) (1.616) (1.033) (1.059) (1.531) 
       
Observations 275 234 174 275 234 174 
R-squared 0.339 0.420 0.471 0.297 0.409 0.503 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table G: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Economic Factors – Recipient 
GNI per capita GDP per capita Growth Rate 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
          
Intervention -0.681 -0.766** -0.0399 0.253* 0.0236 0.686* -2.928 -0.246 -2.313 
 (0.552) (0.309) (0.446) (0.149) (0.114) (0.372) (4.079) (3.800) (9.275) 
Middle East 0.291 0.447 -0.889** -0.239* -0.178 -0.574** -8.179** -9.781** -10.29** 
 (0.552) (0.497) (0.445) (0.137) (0.195) (0.235) (4.051) (4.848) (4.940) 
Africa -1.722*** -2.013*** -2.871*** -0.294*** -0.411*** -0.836*** -5.722 -7.227* -5.406 
 (0.445) (0.423) (0.397) (0.108) (0.152) (0.193) (3.954) (4.272) (4.218) 
Asia -1.851*** -1.633*** -2.258*** -0.135 -0.131 -0.410** -5.201 -6.463* -7.408* 
 (0.442) (0.413) (0.385) (0.114) (0.166) (0.205) (3.776) (3.903) (4.091) 
Americas -0.399 0.0303 -0.555 -0.123 -0.119 -0.560** -4.500 -8.247* -7.862 
 (0.556) (0.509) (0.443) (0.157) (0.193) (0.219) (4.188) (4.708) (4.845) 
Length 4.85e-05 -6.96e-06 8.87e-06 2.91e-06 1.55e-06 -1.41e-05 -9.40e-05 -9.23e-05 -0.000206 
 (2.97e-05) (2.42e-05) (3.35e-05) (8.67e-06) (1.16e-05) (1.49e-05) (0.000183) (0.000230) (0.000265) 
Cold War -0.136 -0.269 0.154 -0.0666 -0.247* -0.0107 0.840 1.311 -1.576 
 (0.432) (0.377) (0.524) (0.0839) (0.128) (0.235) (2.829) (3.006) (4.333) 
Intensity -0.151 -0.284 -0.651* -0.0649 -0.196 -0.349* 6.386* 7.379* -0.0336 
 (0.348) (0.367) (0.372) (0.0939) (0.128) (0.201) (3.525) (3.783) (4.956) 
Cumulative 
Intensity 
-0.129 0.328 0.167 0.121 0.199* 0.312* -0.669 -1.081 2.210 
 (0.247) (0.229) (0.329) (0.0830) (0.116) (0.177) (1.537) (2.098) (2.583) 
War in Five -0.271 -0.0538 -0.363 -0.0154 -0.00506 -0.177 2.397 3.722* 3.115 
 (0.268) (0.211) (0.255) (0.0541) (0.0825) (0.138) (1.564) (2.134) (2.511) 
Incompatibility -0.549** -0.292 -0.239 -0.0446 -0.0655 -0.0125 3.973** 6.010*** 4.687** 
 (0.267) (0.228) (0.239) (0.0579) (0.0876) (0.128) (1.573) (2.009) (2.167) 
Democracy 0.107 0.316 0.430* -0.0356 0.0148 0.162 2.077 2.458 2.164 
 (0.248) (0.203) (0.236) (0.0574) (0.0850) (0.115) (1.441) (1.983) (1.947) 
Side A X 
Intervention 
0.323 0.414 2.443*** -0.473** 0.0530 0.327 -1.545 -8.123 -1.954 
 (0.911) (0.561) (0.659) (0.224) (0.428) (0.488) (7.947) (9.247) (10.46) 
Side B X 
Intervention 
0.813 1.008* 0.464 -0.161 0.0178 -0.595 -1.650 -1.078 -7.211 
 (0.751) (0.536) (0.689) (0.211) (0.243) (0.471) (5.170) (5.291) (10.80) 
o.SideA - - - - - - - - - 
          
o.SideB - - - - - - - - - 
          
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 6.582*** 6.488*** 8.784*** 0.465** 0.807** 2.216*** -3.429 -0.961 9.516 
 (0.806) (0.676) (0.705) (0.220) (0.317) (0.437) (6.823) (6.754) (8.312) 
          
Observations 198 184 140 267 233 167 291 257 198 
R-squared 0.615 0.683 0.755 0.502 0.627 0.663 0.298 0.275 0.281 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table H: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Social Factors – Recipient 
 Mortality Rate Life Expectancy 
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VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
       
Intervention 2.317 -3.243 -15.79 -0.121 0.000667 -0.846 
 (8.349) (12.33) (20.44) (0.701) (1.199) (2.114) 
Middle East -12.02*** -22.78*** -50.31*** 2.144*** 3.996*** 5.856*** 
 (3.589) (6.517) (11.98) (0.525) (0.853) (1.738) 
Africa -17.27*** -34.35*** -73.91*** 1.471*** 2.779*** 5.174*** 
 (3.423) (6.017) (11.39) (0.483) (0.671) (1.330) 
Asia -12.19*** -23.27*** -49.13*** 1.220*** 2.320*** 4.317*** 
 (2.946) (5.177) (9.958) (0.456) (0.632) (1.237) 
Americas -12.10*** -23.28*** -39.91*** 1.188** 2.451*** 3.897** 
 (3.433) (6.735) (11.88) (0.469) (0.731) (1.607) 
Length 0.000350 0.00105** 0.00169** -2.14e-05 -7.07e-05 -0.000198 
 (0.000223) (0.000407) (0.000719) (3.71e-05) (5.49e-05) (0.000122) 
Cold War 0.217 -1.774 -1.913 -0.202 -0.348 1.697 
 (3.646) (6.778) (14.75) (0.644) (0.989) (2.180) 
Intensity -3.110 -3.692 -6.855 0.0908 -0.00721 -0.177 
 (3.289) (6.275) (10.46) (0.615) (0.978) (1.715) 
Cumulative 
Intensity 
-3.465* -6.261* -1.821 0.538** 0.922** 1.019 
 (1.779) (3.548) (6.907) (0.225) (0.394) (1.057) 
War in Five -3.234* -7.785** -11.26* 0.169 0.426 -0.323 
 (1.912) (3.712) (6.707) (0.273) (0.475) (0.849) 
Incompatibility -1.696 -1.858 0.877 0.218 0.0193 -0.617 
 (1.995) (3.912) (7.538) (0.250) (0.440) (0.966) 
Democracy 1.315 1.193 -1.844 -0.123 0.00570 0.0936 
 (1.986) (3.747) (6.408) (0.279) (0.441) (0.992) 
Side A X 
Intervention 
-17.81 -23.57 -21.12 0.867 2.269 5.241 
 (13.43) (20.83) (37.32) (0.945) (1.542) (3.576) 
Side B X 
Intervention 
-4.091 -2.788 -14.15 -0.264 0.0423 2.526 
 (9.388) (14.87) (29.00) (0.951) (1.480) (2.638) 
o.SideA - - - - - - 
       
o.SideB - - - - - - 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -12.41* -8.543 18.05 1.601* 2.333* 0.502 
 (6.615) (12.25) (25.02) (0.891) (1.311) (2.631) 
       
Observations 308 275 204 307 280 216 
R-squared 0.422 0.413 0.452 0.273 0.304 0.934 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table I: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Political Factors – Recipient 
 Democracy Level Autocracy Level 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
       
Intervention -0.983* -0.791 0.0351 -0.413 -0.606 -0.537 
 (0.512) (1.018) (1.126) (0.783) (1.125) (1.237) 
Middle East -1.716*** -2.045*** -2.000* 0.596 0.921 0.356 
 (0.623) (0.777) (1.097) (0.609) (0.747) (1.043) 
Africa -1.390** -1.060 -1.942* -0.108 -0.290 -0.589 
 (0.653) (0.859) (1.095) (0.583) (0.695) (0.807) 
Asia -1.460*** -2.001*** -1.183 0.280 0.782 -0.491 
 (0.528) (0.728) (0.976) (0.459) (0.593) (0.722) 
Americas 0.578 0.680 0.603 -0.238 -0.410 -0.714 
 (0.715) (0.857) (1.173) (0.634) (0.644) (0.902) 
Length -4.76e-05 -6.26e-05 -0.000184** 4.56e-05 4.94e-05 7.60e-05 
 (4.10e-05) (5.51e-05) (7.59e-05) (3.69e-05) (4.88e-05) (6.21e-05) 
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Cold War 1.395** 0.846 0.805 -1.285*** -1.048* -1.240 
 (0.540) (0.695) (1.040) (0.479) (0.584) (0.844) 
Intensity 0.0261 -0.452 -1.184 -0.121 -0.0458 0.141 
 (0.422) (0.711) (0.900) (0.426) (0.616) (0.802) 
Cumulative 
Intensity 
0.548* 0.666 0.947 -0.422 -0.468 -0.223 
 (0.312) (0.533) (0.902) (0.268) (0.426) (0.727) 
War in Five 0.399 0.0125 0.425 -0.149 -0.0436 -0.240 
 (0.318) (0.492) (0.604) (0.298) (0.381) (0.542) 
Incompatibility -0.227 -0.877* -0.537 0.141 0.453 0.170 
 (0.351) (0.476) (0.610) (0.314) (0.424) (0.593) 
Democracy -1.601*** -2.387*** -2.992*** 1.187*** 1.471*** 2.859*** 
 (0.340) (0.428) (0.526) (0.294) (0.343) (0.428) 
Side A X 
Intervention 
0.401 1.574 1.840 -0.0609 -0.0970 -1.365 
 (1.142) (2.003) (2.103) (1.289) (1.573) (1.958) 
Side B X 
Intervention 
0.478 0.626 -3.194* 0.475 0.962 0.854 
 (0.762) (1.338) (1.804) (0.880) (1.261) (2.063) 
o.SideA - - - - - - 
       
o.SideB - - - - - - 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.133 -0.640 1.744 0.487 0.435 -0.394 
 (1.399) (1.848) (1.749) (1.081) (1.061) (1.566) 
       
Observations 275 234 174 275 234 174 
R-squared 0.331 0.405 0.455 0.284 0.398 0.470 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table J: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Economic Factors – Number of Interveners 
 GNI per capita GDP per capita Growth Rate 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
          
Intervention -0.0101 0.0767 0.608 0.106 0.113 0.113 -6.415** -2.926 -5.491 
 (0.380) (0.387) (0.787) (0.118) (0.172) (0.459) (2.744) (3.355) (8.516) 
Middle East 0.313 0.509 -0.879* -0.200 -0.196 -0.582** -7.815** -8.832* -10.24** 
 (0.505) (0.475) (0.446) (0.131) (0.188) (0.236) (3.671) (4.696) (4.995) 
Africa -1.704*** -1.949*** -2.872*** -0.252** -0.428*** -0.831*** -5.360 -6.291 -5.275 
 (0.373) (0.390) (0.397) (0.0975) (0.146) (0.192) (3.413) (3.944) (4.226) 
Asia -1.818*** -1.559*** -2.256*** -0.0995 -0.147 -0.413** -4.847 -5.593 -7.430* 
 (0.396) (0.389) (0.385) (0.105) (0.159) (0.204) (3.323) (3.691) (4.100) 
Americas -0.403 0.0585 -0.555 -0.0995 -0.129 -0.556** -4.236 -7.674* -7.665 
 (0.536) (0.498) (0.443) (0.153) (0.190) (0.218) (3.967) (4.611) (4.835) 
Length 4.97e-05* -7.40e-06 8.70e-06 3.37e-06 1.85e-06 -1.39e-05 -9.60e-05 -8.58e-05 -0.000207 
 (2.98e-05) (2.46e-05) (3.36e-05) (8.72e-
06) 
(1.15e-05) (1.49e-05) (0.000183) (0.000227) (0.000265) 
Cold War -0.155 -0.305 0.153 -0.0529 -0.245* -0.00235 0.778 1.475 -1.370 
 (0.423) (0.370) (0.525) (0.0827) (0.127) (0.235) (2.792) (2.942) (4.324) 
Intensity -0.127 -0.260 -0.653* -0.0427 -0.171 -0.323 5.791 7.193* 0.468 
 (0.364) (0.391) (0.371) (0.0983) (0.127) (0.202) (3.543) (3.798) (4.940) 
Cumulative Intensity -0.134 0.318 0.166 0.110 0.194 0.302* -0.610 -1.304 2.013 
 (0.248) (0.229) (0.329) (0.0839) (0.118) (0.177) (1.523) (2.049) (2.593) 
War in Five -0.284 -0.0621 -0.371 -0.0160 -0.0111 -0.166 2.504 3.810* 3.296 
 (0.268) (0.215) (0.253) (0.0543) (0.0833) (0.136) (1.562) (2.156) (2.535) 
Incompatibility -0.546** -0.273 -0.245 -0.0327 -0.0726 -0.00337 4.095*** 6.297*** 4.801** 
 (0.262) (0.224) (0.239) (0.0566) (0.0854) (0.127) (1.536) (1.967) (2.150) 
Democracy 0.109 0.338* 0.423* -0.0261 0.00742 0.161 2.233 2.713 2.063 
 (0.231) (0.198) (0.241) (0.0573) (0.0840) (0.117) (1.468) (1.989) (1.982) 
Number of Interveners 
X Intervention 
-0.0498 -0.0270 -0.208 -0.0197 -0.0279* 0.112 0.907*** 0.338 -0.858 
 (0.0502) (0.0356) (0.305) (0.0123) (0.0157) (0.254) (0.297) (0.364) (4.180) 
o.Number of 
interveners 
- - - - - - - - - 
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Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 6.854*** 6.656*** 9.237*** 0.439** 0.847*** 1.845*** -3.764 -2.161 9.086 
 (0.723) (0.641) (0.587) (0.195) (0.272) (0.528) (6.267) (6.326) (8.334) 
          
Observations    267 233 167 291 257 198 
R-squared -0.0101 0.0767 0.608 0.497 0.629 0.660 0.304 0.273 0.279 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table K: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Social Factors – Number of Interveners 
 Mortality Rate Life Expectancy 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
       
Intervention -5.997 -12.39 -32.37 0.329 0.834 2.150 
 (4.218) (7.734) (26.10) (0.624) (1.054) (2.361) 
Middle East -9.729*** -19.80*** -50.06*** 2.019*** 3.792*** 5.726*** 
 (3.480) (6.353) (11.89) (0.521) (0.854) (1.727) 
Africa -15.05*** -31.66*** -73.57*** 1.361*** 2.606*** 5.018*** 
 (3.074) (5.755) (11.34) (0.470) (0.673) (1.323) 
Asia -10.23*** -20.90*** -49.11*** 1.097** 2.132*** 4.208*** 
 (2.609) (4.924) (9.928) (0.446) (0.633) (1.246) 
Americas -10.86*** -21.84*** -39.85*** 1.142** 2.424*** 3.962** 
 (3.257) (6.589) (11.84) (0.469) (0.732) (1.608) 
Length 0.000364 0.00107*** 0.00169** -2.09e-05 -7.24e-05 -0.000200 
 (0.000224) (0.000408) (0.000721) (3.72e-05) (5.51e-05) (0.000122) 
Cold War 0.352 -1.682 -1.801 -0.188 -0.350 1.675 
 (3.662) (6.798) (14.75) (0.643) (0.986) (2.196) 
Intensity -3.877 -5.128 -6.758 0.0958 -0.0594 -0.354 
 (3.535) (6.565) (10.46) (0.602) (0.966) (1.723) 
Cumulative Intensity -3.746** -6.709* -1.831 0.548** 0.962** 1.032 
 (1.864) (3.649) (6.897) (0.225) (0.398) (1.062) 
War in Five -3.137 -7.565** -11.07* 0.180 0.442 -0.351 
 (1.903) (3.725) (6.691) (0.272) (0.475) (0.861) 
Incompatibility -1.154 -1.092 1.085 0.196 -0.0264 -0.680 
 (1.931) (3.837) (7.463) (0.245) (0.435) (0.959) 
Democracy 1.910 2.019 -1.692 -0.151 -0.0677 -0.0154 
 (1.972) (3.749) (6.412) (0.282) (0.445) (0.969) 
Number of Interveners X 
Intervention 
0.768 1.297* 3.287 -0.259 -0.230 -0.374 
 (0.525) (0.783) (13.20) (0.417) (0.601) (1.253) 
o.Number of interveners - - - - - - 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -13.73** -10.15 10.13 1.765** 2.541** 1.114 
 (5.878) (10.76) (26.95) (0.860) (1.241) (2.573) 
       
Observations 308 275 204 307 280 216 
R-squared 0.412 0.408 0.451 0.269 0.299 0.934 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table L: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Political Factors – Number of Interveners 
 Democracy Level Autocracy Level 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
        
Intervention -1.062**  -0.783 -1.516 0.481 0.496 -0.657 
 (0.460)  (0.796) (2.187) (0.356) (0.553) (1.962) 
Middle East -1.654***  -2.053*** -2.165* 0.566 0.935 0.418 
 (0.594)  (0.756) (1.138) (0.580) (0.723) (1.054) 
Africa -1.329**  -1.042 -2.108* -0.126 -0.302 -0.508 
 (0.609)  (0.839) (1.121) (0.537) (0.671) (0.804) 
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Asia -1.389***  -1.991*** -1.380 0.253 0.805 -0.411 
 (0.491)  (0.706) (0.996) (0.422) (0.566) (0.719) 
Americas 0.636  0.765 0.634 -0.294 -0.462 -0.725 
 (0.709)  (0.849) (1.202) (0.630) (0.644) (0.920) 
Length -4.94e-05  -6.51e-05 -0.000182** 4.78e-05 4.99e-05 7.53e-05 
 (4.08e-05)  (5.44e-05) (7.67e-05) (3.65e-05) (4.83e-05) (6.24e-05) 
Cold War 1.375**  0.812 0.850 -1.267*** -1.044* -1.260 
 (0.539)  (0.689) (1.048) (0.477) (0.582) (0.846) 
Intensity -0.217  -0.832 -1.072 0.130 0.147 0.0930 
 (0.367)  (0.634) (0.894) (0.366) (0.597) (0.796) 
Cumulative Intensity 0.577*  0.717 0.836 -0.454* -0.492 -0.170 
 (0.308)  (0.526) (0.915) (0.264) (0.422) (0.729) 
War in Five 0.427  0.0841 0.458 -0.179 -0.0864 -0.247 
 (0.315)  (0.483) (0.609) (0.295) (0.378) (0.544) 
Incompatibility -0.209  -0.863* -0.442 0.136 0.451 0.130 
 (0.344)  (0.470) (0.613) (0.308) (0.418) (0.581) 
Democracy -1.576***  -2.377*** -3.211*** 1.182*** 1.483*** 2.953*** 
 (0.338)  (0.422) (0.555) (0.290) (0.339) (0.440) 
Number of Interveners X 
Intervention 
0.221***  0.337*** 0.222 -0.284*** -0.230*** 0.126 
 (0.0562)  (0.0788) (0.770) (0.0433) (0.0520) (0.699) 
o.Number of interveners -  - - - - - 
        
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.342  -0.870 0.722 0.728 0.718 -0.160 
   (1.921) (1.653) (0.972) (0.988) (1.299) 
        
Observations   234 174 275 234 174 
R-squared   0.419 0.435 0.305 0.405 0.466 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table M: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Economic Factors- Neighboring Intervener 
 GNI per Capita GDP per Capita Growth Rate 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
          
Intervention 0.0401 -0.0188 0.465 -0.151* -0.208 -0.146 -5.525* 2.300 -4.426 
 (0.526) (0.617) (0.720) (0.0860) (0.190) (0.239) (3.151) (2.556) (3.299) 
Middle East 0.338 0.530 -0.865* -0.179 -0.176 -0.611*** -8.073** -9.120* -10.06** 
 (0.505) (0.471) (0.447) (0.131) (0.184) (0.232) (3.728) (4.671) (5.046) 
Africa -1.698*** -1.932*** -2.874*** -0.225** -0.397*** -0.833*** -5.546 -6.747* -5.241 
 (0.373) (0.390) (0.398) (0.0990) (0.143) (0.192) (3.464) (3.893) (4.227) 
Asia -1.819*** -1.540*** -2.259*** -0.0681 -0.110 -0.398* -5.046 -6.127* -7.443* 
 (0.397) (0.390) (0.386) (0.107) (0.157) (0.203) (3.376) (3.682) (4.109) 
Americas -0.399 0.0711 -0.563 -0.0797 -0.106 -0.552** -4.375 -8.045* -7.669 
 (0.535) (0.498) (0.443) (0.153) (0.188) (0.218) (4.000) (4.607) (4.817) 
Length 5.02e-05* -8.31e-06 9.77e-06 2.24e-06 3.08e-08 -1.64e-05 -9.63e-05 -6.46e-05 -0.000196 
 (2.99e-05) (2.47e-05) (3.33e-05) (8.69e-06) (1.15e-05) (1.50e-05) (0.000184) (0.000226) (0.000264) 
Cold War -0.158 -0.311 0.144 -0.0626 -0.255** -0.00253 0.845 1.620 -1.402 
 (0.425) (0.369) (0.522) (0.0826) (0.127) (0.236) (2.753) (2.949) (4.278) 
Intensity -0.170 -0.297 -0.655* -0.0811 -0.228* -0.374* 6.347* 7.894** 0.662 
 (0.353) (0.378) (0.375) (0.0976) (0.130) (0.199) (3.496) (3.756) (4.927) 
Cumulative Intensity -0.138 0.327 0.165 0.126 0.218* 0.330* -0.621 -1.617 1.901 
 (0.250) (0.234) (0.328) (0.0846) (0.119) (0.177) (1.548) (2.066) (2.636) 
War in Five -0.271 -0.0549 -0.369 -0.0197 -0.0106 -0.181 2.375 3.774* 3.345 
 (0.268) (0.213) (0.252) (0.0550) (0.0823) (0.137) (1.562) (2.142) (2.549) 
Incompatibility -0.537** -0.267 -0.234 -0.0361 -0.0755 -0.0313 3.951** 6.339*** 4.919** 
 (0.260) (0.224) (0.240) (0.0565) (0.0843) (0.129) (1.546) (1.970) (2.192) 
Democracy 0.125 0.347* 0.438* -0.0232 0.0106 0.153 2.084 2.709 2.127 
 (0.231) (0.195) (0.234) (0.0572) (0.0833) (0.113) (1.473) (1.970) (1.946) 
Neighboring Intervener X 
Intervention  
-0.254 0.0404 -0.403 0.307** 0.398 0.905** 1.855 -6.843 -4.951 
 (0.638) (0.658) (0.805) (0.150) (0.251) (0.355) (4.577) (4.423) (10.28) 
o.Neighboring Intervener - - - - - - - - - 
          
Year F.E. Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
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Constant 6.633*** 6.644*** 8.741*** 0.617*** 1.058*** 2.462*** -3.582 -1.885 8.962 
 (0.798) (0.786) (0.858) (0.176) (0.298) (0.422) (6.346) (6.407) (8.363) 
          
Observations 198 184 140 267 233 167 291 257 198 
R-squared 0.612 0.680 0.755 0.502 0.632 0.670 0.298 0.276 0.280 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table N: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Social Factors- Neighboring Intervener 
 Mortality Rate Life Expectancy 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
       
Intervention -4.073 -10.59 -40.12* 0.588* 1.561** 3.374** 
 (4.785) (9.583) (22.35) (0.329) (0.705) (1.683) 
Middle East -10.02*** -20.27*** -50.05*** 1.948*** 3.741*** 5.804*** 
 (3.506) (6.332) (11.79) (0.533) (0.864) (1.734) 
Africa -15.32*** -32.13*** -73.40*** 1.269*** 2.548*** 5.033*** 
 (3.172) (5.809) (11.27) (0.480) (0.671) (1.311) 
Asia -10.56*** -21.38*** -48.66*** 1.001** 2.045*** 4.163*** 
 (2.765) (5.073) (9.947) (0.461) (0.643) (1.240) 
Americas -11.09*** -22.20*** -39.68*** 1.047** 2.317*** 3.832** 
 (3.349) (6.686) (11.88) (0.485) (0.739) (1.609) 
Length 0.000370 0.00107** 0.00166** -1.94e-05 -6.85e-05 -0.000191 
 (0.000227) (0.000415) (0.000724) (3.73e-05) (5.50e-05) (0.000122) 
Cold War 0.457 -1.576 -1.591 -0.189 -0.350 1.640 
 (3.656) (6.786) (14.72) (0.641) (0.981) (2.177) 
Intensity -3.357 -4.384 -8.253 0.154 0.0844 -0.0111 
 (3.319) (6.265) (10.33) (0.596) (0.962) (1.710) 
Cumulative Intensity -3.823** -6.781* -1.450 0.518** 0.884** 0.879 
 (1.888) (3.683) (6.948) (0.228) (0.399) (1.065) 
War in Five -3.219* -7.796** -11.31* 0.191 0.448 -0.327 
 (1.897) (3.709) (6.693) (0.273) (0.473) (0.852) 
Incompatibility -1.220 -1.300 0.682 0.202 -0.00141 -0.607 
 (1.940) (3.852) (7.485) (0.242) (0.433) (0.954) 
Democracy 1.784 1.770 -1.740 -0.152 -0.0615 0.0270 
 (1.967) (3.724) (6.366) (0.284) (0.446) (0.968) 
Neighboring Intervener X 
Intervention  
-0.399 1.753 26.02 -1.133* -1.893* -3.964* 
 (6.227) (12.26) (29.23) (0.622) (1.018) (2.193) 
o.Neighboring Intervener - - - - - - 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -12.94** -7.235 27.57 1.329* 1.872 -0.119 
 (6.484) (12.54) (26.58) (0.736) (1.142) (2.481) 
       
Observations 308 275 204 307 280 216 
R-squared 0.409 0.406 0.454 0.276 0.306 0.935 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table O: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Political Factors- Neighboring Intervener 
 Democracy Level  Autocracy Level 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
       
Intervention -0.206 -0.323 -2.518** -0.225 0.266 0.131 
 (0.586) (1.005) (1.144) (0.465) (0.655) (1.296) 
Middle East -1.814*** -2.111*** -2.201** 0.672 0.959 0.471 
 (0.611) (0.766) (1.079) (0.596) (0.733) (1.023) 
Africa -1.486** -1.123 -2.122** -0.0232 -0.261 -0.489 
 (0.630) (0.843) (1.070) (0.557) (0.685) (0.793) 
Asia -1.554*** -2.052*** -1.304 0.362 0.832 -0.431 
 (0.515) (0.714) (0.958) (0.444) (0.580) (0.716) 
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Americas 0.496 0.701 0.713 -0.198 -0.433 -0.759 
 (0.714) (0.853) (1.182) (0.634) (0.653) (0.922) 
Length -4.78e-05 -6.40e-05 -0.000191** 4.58e-05 4.92e-05 7.99e-05 
 (4.07e-05) (5.47e-05) (7.59e-05) (3.67e-05) (4.85e-05) (6.20e-05) 
Cold War 1.424*** 0.814 0.925 -1.294*** -1.040* -1.295 
 (0.540) (0.694) (1.028) (0.479) (0.585) (0.847) 
Intensity 0.0615 -0.578 -1.358 -0.160 -0.0135 0.255 
 (0.408) (0.672) (0.881) (0.410) (0.595) (0.797) 
Cumulative Intensity 0.535* 0.705 1.017 -0.420 -0.487 -0.265 
 (0.308) (0.528) (0.900) (0.262) (0.422) (0.727) 
War in Five 0.415 0.0213 0.478 -0.150 -0.0422 -0.266 
 (0.317) (0.488) (0.595) (0.298) (0.381) (0.539) 
Incompatibility -0.225 -0.901* -0.453 0.157 0.476 0.140 
 (0.345) (0.472) (0.603) (0.310) (0.419) (0.574) 
Democracy -1.630*** -2.383*** -3.054*** 1.216*** 1.479*** 2.878*** 
 (0.343) (0.434) (0.538) (0.295) (0.347) (0.436) 
Neighboring Intervener X 
Intervention  
-0.764 0.769 4.535** 0.160 -0.702 -1.995 
 (0.879) (1.514) (1.947) (0.774) (0.979) (1.745) 
o.Neighboring Intervener - - - - - - 
       
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.055 -0.452 1.379 0.525 0.404 -0.295 
 (1.301) (1.802) (1.639) (1.001) (1.039) (1.435) 
       
Observations 275 234 174 275 234 174 
R-squared 0.333 0.404 0.452 0.283 0.396 0.470 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table P: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Economic Factors- Regional Intervener 
 GNI per Capita GDP per Capita Growth Rate 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
          
Intervention -0.484 -0.875 1.192* -0.212*** -0.484*** -0.292 -5.949* 3.371 -6.304 
 (0.593) (0.912) (0.636) (0.0805) (0.154) (0.259) (3.346) (3.252) (3.812) 
Middle East 0.355 0.513 -0.799* -0.187 -0.185 -0.618*** -8.114** -9.008* -10.23** 
 (0.501) (0.472) (0.444) (0.131) (0.183) (0.233) (3.713) (4.669) (5.030) 
Africa -1.648*** -1.910*** -2.868*** -0.233** -0.401*** -0.835*** -5.602 -6.574* -5.286 
 (0.373) (0.389) (0.399) (0.0983) (0.144) (0.191) (3.444) (3.887) (4.225) 
Asia -1.759*** -1.492*** -2.307*** -0.0752 -0.106 -0.382* -5.093 -5.972 -7.436* 
 (0.397) (0.390) (0.388) (0.106) (0.156) (0.202) (3.363) (3.666) (4.099) 
Americas -0.358 0.0823 -0.560 -0.0854 -0.106 -0.547** -4.418 -7.899* -7.702 
 (0.534) (0.499) (0.441) (0.153) (0.188) (0.217) (3.985) (4.591) (4.817) 
Length 4.95e-05* -7.71e-06 6.21e-06 3.28e-06 1.81e-06 -1.36e-05 -9.21e-05 -8.24e-05 -0.000206 
 (2.97e-05) (2.43e-05) (3.32e-05) (8.69e-06) (1.15e-05) (1.49e-05) (0.000183) (0.000227) (0.000264) 
Cold War -0.176 -0.310 0.187 -0.0599 -0.253** -0.0227 0.868 1.529 -1.395 
 (0.423) (0.364) (0.520) (0.0828) (0.126) (0.236) (2.765) (2.934) (4.310) 
Intensity -0.208 -0.306 -0.628* -0.0668 -0.212* -0.353* 6.405* 7.621** 0.412 
 (0.351) (0.365) (0.370) (0.0964) (0.126) (0.196) (3.478) (3.714) (4.880) 
Cumulative Intensity -0.125 0.308 0.157 0.114 0.200* 0.328* -0.676 -1.377 2.026 
 (0.246) (0.218) (0.327) (0.0835) (0.117) (0.176) (1.532) (2.050) (2.646) 
War in Five -0.292 -0.0937 -0.329 -0.0203 -0.0180 -0.169 2.369 3.827* 3.287 
 (0.270) (0.214) (0.246) (0.0545) (0.0818) (0.136) (1.567) (2.151) (2.534) 
Incompatibility -0.568** -0.311 -0.186 -0.0420 -0.0948 -0.0389 3.926** 6.430*** 4.819** 
 (0.259) (0.224) (0.237) (0.0568) (0.0847) (0.130) (1.553) (1.992) (2.199) 
Democracy 0.121 0.326* 0.454* -0.0267 0.000415 0.137 2.073 2.744 2.116 
 (0.231) (0.191) (0.235) (0.0573) (0.0825) (0.114) (1.474) (1.978) (1.948) 
Regional Intervener X 
Intervention 
0.454 1.116 -1.413* 0.337** 0.686*** 0.958*** 2.105 -7.018 -0.995 
 (0.679) (0.931) (0.775) (0.140) (0.221) (0.349) (4.333) (4.691) (9.099) 
o.Regional Intervener - - - - - - - - - 
          
F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 7.152*** 7.514*** 7.958*** 0.691*** 1.356*** 2.633*** -3.525 -2.080 9.102 
 (0.854) (1.078) (0.792) (0.175) (0.285) (0.446) (6.350) (6.389) (8.322) 
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Observations 198 184 140 267 233 167 291 257 198 
R-squared 0.613 0.685 0.760 0.500 0.638 0.670 0.298 0.275 0.279 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table Q: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Social Factors- Regional Intervener 
 Mortality Rate Life Expectancy 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
       
Intervention 3.540 2.827 -7.027 0.427 0.621 2.913 
 (3.728) (7.330) (15.44) (0.376) (0.864) (2.149) 
Middle East -10.18*** -20.42*** -49.00*** 1.987*** 3.776*** 5.762*** 
 (3.455) (6.281) (11.83) (0.526) (0.857) (1.729) 
Africa -15.71*** -32.65*** -73.84*** 1.308*** 2.581*** 4.992*** 
 (3.133) (5.770) (11.39) (0.475) (0.672) (1.318) 
Asia -10.98*** -22.05*** -50.03*** 1.043** 2.113*** 4.124*** 
 (2.701) (4.985) (9.942) (0.456) (0.642) (1.252) 
Americas -11.45*** -22.77*** -40.58*** 1.115** 2.420*** 3.936** 
 (3.329) (6.637) (11.82) (0.475) (0.735) (1.611) 
Length 0.000371 0.00108*** 0.00172** -2.17e-05 -7.35e-05 -0.000197 
 (0.000226) (0.000411) (0.000719) (3.75e-05) (5.55e-05) (0.000122) 
Cold War 0.492 -1.601 -1.626 -0.201 -0.362 1.673 
 (3.656) (6.790) (14.77) (0.640) (0.979) (2.191) 
Intensity -3.227 -3.942 -5.402 0.0718 -0.0868 -0.325 
 (3.358) (6.347) (10.60) (0.590) (0.946) (1.667) 
Cumulative Intensity -3.884** -6.930* -3.154 0.557** 0.973** 0.972 
 (1.871) (3.650) (6.841) (0.229) (0.399) (1.059) 
War in Five -3.109 -7.646** -11.05* 0.190 0.448 -0.349 
 (1.890) (3.689) (6.655) (0.272) (0.474) (0.856) 
Incompatibility -0.878 -0.650 2.394 0.206 -0.0265 -0.624 
 (1.958) (3.871) (7.471) (0.243) (0.436) (0.959) 
Democracy 1.862 1.985 -1.648 -0.160 -0.0762 -0.00413 
 (1.960) (3.722) (6.427) (0.287) (0.449) (0.967) 
Regional Intervener X 
Intervention 
-9.908* -16.15 -31.76 -0.665 -0.206 -2.088 
 (5.649) (10.86) (27.05) (0.602) (1.108) (2.512) 
o.Regional Intervener - - - - - - 
       
F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -20.59*** -20.83* -5.988 1.384* 2.338* 0.166 
 (5.801) (10.97) (21.13) (0.731) (1.234) (2.604) 
       
Observations 308 275 204 307 280 216 
R-squared 0.414 0.409 0.455 0.270 0.298 0.934 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table R: The Types of Intervention and Interveners Political Factors- Regional Intervener 
 Democracy Level Autocracy Level 
VARIABLES Five Ten Twenty Five Ten Twenty 
       
Intervention -0.695 0.170 -1.365* 0.309 0.459 -0.869 
 (0.797) (2.017) (0.701) (0.680) (1.067) (0.918) 
Middle East -1.711*** -2.187*** -2.131* 0.614 0.995 0.434 
 (0.598) (0.770) (1.119) (0.588) (0.728) (1.033) 
Africa -1.383** -1.192 -2.096* -0.0855 -0.228 -0.502 
 (0.618) (0.849) (1.118) (0.544) (0.677) (0.808) 
Asia -1.445*** -2.126*** -1.353 0.291 0.852 -0.375 
 (0.497) (0.720) (0.995) (0.431) (0.581) (0.721) 
Americas 0.583 0.633 0.632 -0.246 -0.404 -0.730 
 (0.709) (0.856) (1.202) (0.633) (0.648) (0.927) 
Rudman 78 
 
Length -4.77e-05 -6.38e-05 -0.000182** 4.52e-05 4.81e-05 7.52e-05 
 (4.09e-05) (5.48e-05) (7.66e-05) (3.69e-05) (4.88e-05) (6.27e-05) 
Cold War 1.389** 0.843 0.845 -1.276*** -1.055* -1.268 
 (0.538) (0.691) (1.048) (0.478) (0.582) (0.848) 
Intensity -0.00240 -0.519 -1.049 -0.142 -0.0797 0.0866 
 (0.405) (0.684) (0.897) (0.415) (0.603) (0.802) 
Cumulative Intensity 0.552* 0.694 0.834 -0.420 -0.452 -0.149 
 (0.311) (0.522) (0.902) (0.266) (0.427) (0.724) 
War in Five 0.401 0.0304 0.454 -0.140 -0.0339 -0.240 
 (0.317) (0.486) (0.603) (0.298) (0.383) (0.538) 
Incompatibility -0.229 -0.900* -0.442 0.173 0.499 0.123 
 (0.343) (0.480) (0.612) (0.311) (0.422) (0.578) 
Democracy -1.592*** -2.420*** -3.204*** 1.194*** 1.499*** 2.977*** 
 (0.336) (0.428) (0.564) (0.289) (0.341) (0.458) 
Regional Intervener X 
Intervention 
0.177 -0.162 0.392 -0.653 -0.683 0.824 
 (0.925) (2.236) (2.432) (0.809) (1.243) (2.156) 
o.Regional Intervener - - - - - - 
       
F.E Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.220 -0.644 0.965 0.298 0.259 0.114 
 (1.461) (2.133) (1.604) (1.175) (1.170) (1.358) 
       
Observations 275 234 174 275 234 174 
R-squared 0.331 0.403 0.435 0.284 0.396 0.467 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
